Torts by Moreau, Frederick J.
Cal Law Trends and Developments




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cal Law Trends and Developments by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frederick J. Moreau, Torts, 1970 Cal Law (1970), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/
vol1970/iss1/11
Torts 
by Frederick J. Moreau* 
I. Introduction 
II. Duty 
A. Overview of Developments in Duty 
B. Duty of the Lawyer to Clients and Third Parties 
C. Products Liability 
D. Nondelegable Duty 
III. Interspousal Imputation of Negligence 
A. In General 
B. A Brief Historical Perspective 
C. A Brief Summary 
* Ph.D. 1922, University of Wiscon-
sin. LL.B. 1925, University of Wiscon-
sin Law School. LL.M. 1937, Columbia 
University. J.D. 1966, University of 
Wisconsin. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of California, Hastings College of 
the Law. Member, Wisconsin and 
Kansas State Bars. 
The author extends his special ap-
CAL LAW 1970 
preciation to Robert E. Jensen, student 
at Golden Gate College, School of Law, 
for his invaluable assistance in the 
preparation of this article. Aside from 
making many useful suggestions and 
furnishing materials most effectively, 
Mr. Jensen is the sole author of 





Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Torts 
IV. Workmen's Compensation v. Tort Liability Under Re-
spondeat Superior 
A. The Going and Coming Rule 
V. Indemnity 
A. In General 
B. Contractual Indemnity 
C. Implied Indemnity 
VI. Abuse of Process 
VII. Conversion 
VIII. Fraud 
A. In General 
B. Opinions by Persons Holding Themselves Out as 
Qualified 
C. Holding a Principal for the Fraud of his Agent 
D. Duty to Speak Out as a Fiduciary 
E. Damages 
IX. Interference with Contractual Rights 
X. Governmental Accountability 
I. Introduction 
"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still" 
(Holmes) . Here is the great antinomy confronting us at 
every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are 
equally destructive. The law, like human kind, if life is to 
continue, must find some path of compromise. Two distinct 
tendencies, pulling in different directions, must be harnessed 
together and made to work in unison. All depends on the 
wisdom with which the joinder is effected. . . . Fusion in 
due proportion is the problem of the ages. [Cardozo, The 
Growth of the Law, 1924, pp. 2 and 3.] 
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A. Overview of Developments in Duty 
In last year's survey we noted the great extension of legal 
duties exacted in a variety of relationships: Dillon v. Legg/ 
finding liability on the part of a driver to a parent who sus-
tained mental disturbance, and resulting injuries, from wit-
nessing injury to and death of her child caused by a breach 
of duty to exercise care towards the child; Rowland v. Chris-
tian,a increasing the duty of the possessor of realty by predi-
cating liability on Civil Code section 1714, which creates a 
duty of ordinary care or skill in the management of property, 
without reference to the old common-law classifications of 
trespasser, licensee, or business invitee; Brockett v. Kitchen 
Boyd Motor CO.,3 finding a duty to refrain from placing a 
person in his own car, knowing of his inebriation and incapac-
ity to drive, with resulting injuries to others; and Connor v. 
The Great Western Savings and Loan Association,4 creating 
a duty on the part of a savings and loan association that fi-
nanced an addition to a city to see to it that the homes built 
therein were not defectively constructed, and holding such 
savings and loan association jointly liable with the builder for 
damages resulting to purchasers of such homes. 
The Connors decision is a landmark case. The fact that 
the State Supreme Court split four to three is indicative of 
its impact. The builders were actively negligent. The ma-
jority found that the builders and the financing association 
were joint venturers, with a community of interest, a joint 
interest, sharing profits and control. Both had a duty to guard 
against defective plans and both were required to make due 
inspections. Thus the later negligence of the builder was not 
a superseding cause of injury, and privity between the home-
1. 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 2. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968); 443 P.2d 561 (1968). 
this case and the two that follow were 3. 264 Cal. App.2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
discussed in greater detail in Moreau, 136 (1968). 
TORTS, Cal Law-Trends and Develop- 4. 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 
ments 1969, pp. 374-392. 447 P.2d 609 (1968). 
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owners and the loan association was not required. Another 
citadel of privity has fallen;5 as Cardozo put it, "The assault 
on the citadel of privity is proceeding apace."6 
The minority, headed by Justice Burke, emphasized that 
there is a great difference between the duties of a supplier of 
capital and the entrepreneur. The former owes its duty to its 
stockholders and there is a complete lack of any agency 
or joint venture between the builder and the lender on which 
to base a duty to the homeowners. 
The case of Rowland v. Christian7 was recognized and ap-
proved in Dixon v. St. Francis Hotel. s Plaintiff was at a hotel 
for lunch, and when she walked toward the dining room she 
stumbled on a plank that was laid on the floor for a painting 
job. The verdict was for plaintiff, but the court granted a new 
trial on the theory that the evidence did not justify the ver-
dict. There was no trap nor inconspicuous danger. Rowland 
was relied on as modifying the common-law dependence on 
plaintiff's status to establish the standard of care owed. Since 
plaintiff could see the situation, a warning would not be neces-
sary; she was as well informed as the defendant as to the 
hazardous condition, yet she was a business invitee. 
Again, we find the Rowland case considered in Beauchamp 
v. Los Gatos Golf Club.9 Plaintiff, a woman golfer, was an in-
vitee. She slipped on cement with her worn golf-shoe spikes 
and fell. The court non-suited her and the reviewing court 
reversed. The Court points out that defendant's duty was to 
exercise ordinary care, as required by Civil Code section 
1714, and Rowland. The status of plaintiff as a trespasser, 
licensee, or invitee is no longer determinative, but is still help-
ful. Here, as in the hotel case, there was no trap or concealed 
peril and there was no liability for what was plain and ob-
servable. Breach of a duty is an indispensable factor, and 
5. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 7. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
50 Minn. L. Rev. p. 791 (1965-66). 443 P.2d 561 (1968). 
6. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 8. 271 Cal. App.2d 739, 77 Cal. 
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 445, 74 Rptr. 201 (1969). 
A.L.R. 1139, 1145 (1931). 9. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
914 (1969). 
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although it was doubtful a breach had occurred, the Court, in 
reversing, held defendant's breach a question of fact for jury 
determination. 
In Holliday v. Miles, Inc.,lO the holding of Rowland was ex-
tended to a case involving the condition of personal property 
that caused damage to Holliday. Holliday was employed by 
Apex, a subcontractor, in erecting a large department store. 
He was using scaffolds owned by his employer but, desiring 
to work in another location where scaffolds had been set up 
by another subcontractor, Miles, he used the latter scaffold 
and was injured when a plank, cross-grained and knotty, broke 
and he fell. Holliday sued Miles, alleging his negligence in 
maintaining such a defective scaffold. Holliday had received 
medical and disability payments from his employer's work-
men's compensation insurer who intervened in the action 
against Miles, seeking to recover its payments. The trial 
court nonsuited both Holliday and the insurance carrier, view-
ing Holliday as a mere licensee to whom no duty of ordinary 
care was owed. Only the insurer appealed. In affirming, 
the Court recognized that Holliday and the insurer were not 
in the same position and had Holliday appealed there might 
have been a reversal as to him only. Appellant's claim was 
not difficult to reject since the insurer stood in the shoes of 
Holliday's employer, that had a nondelegable statutory duty 
to provide its employees with a safe place to work; hence, the 
very defect that would create a liability on the part of Miles to 
Holliday would work to bar the insurer's (employer's) right 
to recover. Both Miles and Apex (Holliday's employer) had 
a duty of care towards Holliday. The same defect was a 
breach as to both. Miles' duty was predicated on Rowland 
and Civil Code section 1714. The court rejected the trial 
court's characterization of Holliday as a mere licensee, dis-
cussing the custom among contractors to allow other con-
tractors to use scaffolds already set up. Such custom reveals a 
mutual advantage or common interest under which circum-
stance Holliday's status would have been that of an invitee; 
10. 266 Cal. App.2d 396, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 96 (1968). 
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although such status is no longer determinative in establishing 
the degree of care owed, it remains a consideration in the 
assessment of liability. 
B. Duty of the Lawyer to Clients and Third Parties 
Shortly after Warren E. Burger became Chief Justice of 
the United States, he addressed the convention of the Amer-
ican Trial Lawyer's Association. His remarks on that occa-
sion have been published in various legal publications. The 
Wisconsin State Bar Journal, October, 1969, carried the re-
marks under the title "A Sick Profession." It carries a bad 
image. He states that medical doctors rank at the top, and 
lawyers about 15th, in popularity, that the majority of lawyers 
are poorly trained, and they are not performing their profes-
sional work properly. Seventy-five percent of lawyers ap-
pearing in court are deficient because of poor preparation, in-
ability to frame questions and inability to prove a case prop-
erly. Fortunately, there are movements in the field of legal 
education that aim to remedy the deficiencies. 
Recent California cases involving the work of lawyers in-
dicate that the deficiencies are not only apparent in the court-
room; the same thing is sometimes true in office work. 
In Heyer v. Flaig,ll Doris, an unmarried widow, asked at-
torney Flaig to prepare her will. She told him that she in-
tended to marry Glen Kilburn, but that she wanted to leave 
her estate equally to her two daughters. On December 21, 
1962, Doris executed her will, and ten days later she married 
Glen Kilburn. Flaig failed to mention the status of the future 
husband as a legatee, although he named him as executor as 
Doris had requested. On July 9, 1963, Doris Kilburn died, 
and her husband claimed a share of the estate as a post-
testamentary spouse. Under section 70 of the Probate Code 
his rights are well established. The daughters, of course, ob-
jected to his participation, as being contrary to their mother's 
intention, and sought recovery of their loss from attorney 
11. 70 Ca1.2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, cussion of this case, see Hill, TRUSTS 
449 P.2d 161 (1969). For further dis- AND ESTATES, in this volume. 
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Flaig. Suit was filed June, 1965. Defenses set up included 
that the statute of limitations had rendered him immune, and 
that the daughters were not in privity with him and therefore he 
owed them no duty. He interposed a demurrer to the com-
plaint and the trial court sustained it, presumably on the theory 
that the action was barred under the statute, two years having 
elapsed since the will had been drawn, but less than two years 
had lapsed since Doris' death. The Court of Appeal affirmed 
in an opinion by Justice Bishop. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the State Supreme Court, relying on 
Lucas v. Hamm/2 which gives an intended beneficiary a cause 
of action for malpractice against an attorney who negligently 
fails to follow the directions of his client. In rejecting the stat-
ute of limitations defense, the Court held that such cause of 
action accrued when the testatrix died, since at that time the 
negligent act of the attorney became irremediable and the 
injury actually occurred; in fact, the wrongful act was a con-
tinuing one until the death of the testatrix. The error could 
have been corrected until her death. The Court agreed that 
privity is unnecessary to establish a duty on the part of attor-
ney Flaig. The beneficiaries' right of action against counsel 
arises out of public policy; a duty of care on the part of the 
attorney accrues directly to the third-party beneficiaries, and 
they need not sue in contract as third-party beneficiaries. The 
Court explained that the interests of the beneficiaries are dif-
ferent from those of the testatrix. The duty owed to the bene-
ficiaries is distinct from the duty owed the testatrix, and con-
sequently the remedies are different. Hence, the Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for trial. 13 
12. 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 
364 P.2d 685 (1961) Cert. Den. 368 
U.S. 987, 7 L.Ed.2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603. 
13. This decision clearly eliminates 
further reliance on the old tragic case 
of Bulkley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 
900, 52 A.S. 88, 31 L.R.A. 862 (1895) 
overruled in 49 Cal.2d 647, 651, 320 
P.2d 16, 19, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358, 1363 
and in 56 Cal.2d 583, 588, 15 Cal. Rptr. 
821, 823, 364 P.2d 685, 687, which has 
CAL LAW 1970 
been so difficult to defend on any the-
ory. The lawyer used a principal bene-
ficiary as an attesting witness, thus mak-
ing it impossible for him to take under 
the will. Yet he had no remedy under 
the "lack of privity" doctrine, a legacy 
to our law from Lord Abinger in 1842, 
who said in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 
Meeson and Wellsby 109, that to allow 
persons not in contractual privity to sue 
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It will be interesting to watch future developments in Heyer 
v. Flaig. It is being sent back to the trial court for further 
action. What will a jury do on being instructed to find wheth-
er defendant has exercised the ordinary care and skill pos-
sessed by the profession? Justice Tobriner indicates how he 
feels about what was done by attorney Flaig. He states, "a 
reasonably prudent attorney should appreciate the conse-
quences of a post testamentary marriage and advise the testa-
tor of such consequences.»l4 Justice Tobriner has written a 
great opinion, a monument to efficiency. 
Another recent case that points out the invulnerability of 
lawyers is Yandell v. Baker.16 A firm of attorneys was con-
sulted by businessmen who felt that they were paying too much 
in taxes. They wanted to know if any changes in their busi-
ness arrangement could remedy their tax situation. The attor-
neys agreed to do something about it in consultation with an 
accounting firm. They advised radical changes in their clients' 
financial structure. Six months after the changes had been 
made, the government advised the clients that they were liable 
for an additional assessment of $80,000. The changes had 
accomplished nothing. They sued the attorneys and were 
met with the defense that a one-year limitation on the action 
had run. The suit had been brought shortly after the govern-
ment's notification of the failure of the defendants' advice. 
But the defendants had completed their work some six months 
surd and outrageous consequences, to been abandoned in this state. The Lu-
which there would be no limit." cas decision did, however, leave us with 
In Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, a monument to carelessness on the part 
320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958), of a lawyer; he could safely violate the 
the Supreme Court, without requiring rule against perpetuities with immunity 
privity, imposed liability upon a notary from liability. It seems to give carte 
who had negligently failed to have a blanche to lawyers to go ahead without 
will properly attested. Biakanja was worrying about what they are doing. 
followed by Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Ca1.2d Some things are just too difficult. Yet 
583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 the rule against perpetuities figures in 
(1961) Cert. Den. 368 U.S. 987,7 L.Ed. most family trusts whether testamentary 
2d 525, 82 S.Ct. 603, which, as already or inter vivos. 
indicated, held that the attorney owed 14. 70 Cal.2d 223, 229, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
a duty of care to the beneficiaries' as 225, 229, 449 P.2d 161, 165 (1969). 
well as the testatrix. Thus the old 15. 258 Cal. App.2d 308, 65 Cal. 
inflexible requirement of privity has . Rptr. 606 (1968); hearing denied. 
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earlier, which was more than a year before the suit had been 
brought. 
The simple question was, when did the statute begin to run? 
If the government had waited a little longer in advising the 
clients, the cause of action for the negligence would have been 
lost before they had any idea of the uselessness of what had 
been done for them. This would have been clearly a wrong 
without a remedy.16 In fraud cases the statute does not begin 
to run until the fraud is discovered,17 and in medical malprac-
tice cases the courts use similar thinking in preserving the 
cause of action until the patient finds out about the injury 
caused by the treatment. IS The Court indicated that it wished 
that it could have followed the rule established in medical 
cases, but thought that it had to take the law as handed down 
by the State Supreme Court. The lawyers were immune. The 
Supreme Court denied a hearing in this case. 
Another case that emphasizes the duties of lawyers is 
Ishmael v. Millington/9 in which attorney Millington repre-
sented both husband and wife in a divorce case. Millington 
had been the husband's lawyer for some time, and it was de-
cided that he alone should put the case through the court. It 
is always dangerous for anyone to place himself in a situation 
where he may be required to serve two masters. Mrs. Ishmael 
signed the complaint and property settlement, relying on what 
16. Chief Justice Marshall once stat-
ed that it was the boast of the law 
that there was no wrong without a rem-
edy. This was in the famous case of 
Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 
660, 665 (1811). Yet he found it im-
possible to give Livingston the remedy 
for Jefferson's trespass on his lands in 
Louisiana "which produces the incon-
venience of a clear right without a rem-
edy." It is odd indeed to refer to such 
a denial as a mere inconvenience. We 
are still some distance from the day 
when all wrongs will be remedied. 
Anyone interested in this litigation 
may find it analyzed most interestingly 
in Beveridge's Life of John Marshall. 
CAL LAW 1970 
Marshall saw no way of holding Jef-
ferson liable for trespass as the trespass 
was made in Louisiana and Jefferson 
was not likely to go there to be sued 
for that which he could not be sued for 
at his home in Virginia. 
17. Code of Civ. Proc. § 338. 
18. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 
2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 27 A.L.R.3d 
884 (1967); in malpractice actions the 
statute of limitations does not com-
mence to run until patient discovers his 
injury or in exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered it. 
19. 241 Cal. App.2d 520, 50 Cal. 
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her husand told her about the extent of the community prop-
erty, and she received $8,807 as her share; it was discovered 
later that the value of community property totaled $82,500.-
00. Ascribing her loss to the failure of attorney Millington 
to make inquiries as to the true value of the community prop-
erty, she brought suit to recover the loss sustained. The attor-
ney assumed that she knew what she was doing, and believed 
she was getting what she was entitled to receive but made no 
effort to ascertain whether his belief was correct. The trial 
court entered summary judgment for the defendant. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the basis 
that there were definite factual issues to be tried. Justice 
Friedman wrote a very significant opinion. There was a 
duty to exercise reasonable care. The representation of both 
parties by counsel is allowed only in "exceptional" situations. 
In such situations, the attorney must disclose all facts which 
would be required by another lawyer. Legal malpractice may 
consist of a negligent failure to act, and such failure need not 
be the sole cause of the client's loss. Here he failed to advise, 
to investigate, and to disclose. The case was sent back for 
trial. 
Justice Friedman's observations on the state of the practice 
in this area of law are worthy of note. He wrote, 
Divorces are frequently uncontested; the parties may 
make their financial arrangements peaceably and honest-
ly; vestigial chivalry may impel them to display the wife as 
the injured plaintiff; the husband may then seek out and 
pay an attorney to escort the wife through the formalities 
of adjudication. We describe these facts of life without 
necessarily approving them. Even in that situation, the 
attorney's professional obligations do not permit his 
descent to the level of a scrivener. The edge of danger 
gleams if the attorney has previously represented the hus-
band.20 
20. 241 Cal. App.2d 520, 527, 50 
Cal. Rptr. 592, 596. 
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C. Products Liability 
In last year's study of this subject, we examined Elmore v. 
American Motors Corporation/ in which parts of the Elmore 
automobile seemed to have fallen from underneath, causing 
Mrs. Elmore to lose control, wrecking the car, killing her, and 
injuring the Waters family, which was traveling in the opposite 
direction. The case seemingly raised the question whether 
the strict liability of the manufacturer would extend to third-
party non-users if liability were established as to the users. 
The Court of Appeal held that the case for strict liability had 
not been proved, so the rights of non-users were not con-
sidered. We intimated that this was a wrong decision, and, 
as the article went to press, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeal, deciding that it was a case for application of 
the doctrine. A footnote reporting the reversal was included 
in our text, pointing out that the Court decided that liability 
would extend to the Waters family as third-party non-users. 
The story is now complete. Privity had long been eliminat-
ed from the ordinary cases charging negligence on the part 
of manufacturers; MacPherson v. Buick Company2 and Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors3 settled that. The question here 
was simply whether the more rigid doctrine of strict liability 
would be extended under similar circumstances. That it will 
is now clearly settled in Californa. The following case decid-
ed during the past year applies the new ruling. In Johnson v. 
Standard Brands Paint CO.,4 Johnson, an independent contrac-
tor, was killed when he fell from a ladder while working in a 
building. He was standing on his own ladder and near him 
was an aluminum extension ladder on which another man was 
working. The aluminum ladder next to Johnson's had been 
purchased from the defendant, Standard Brands Paint Co. 
1. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 
451 P.2d 84 (1969). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Bernhardt, 
REAL PROPERTY, in this volume. Mor-
eau, TORTS, Cal Law-Trends and De-
velopments 1969, pp. 392-402. 
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 
CAL LAW 1970 
Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 440, L.R.AI916 F. 
696 (1916). 
3. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d 69, 75 
AL.R.2d 1 (1960). 
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This ladder had been defectively designed, and the defect 
caused its legs to slip or slide away from the wall and it fell 
against the ladder on which Johnson was standing, causing 
him to fall to his death. Plaintiff secured a favorable verdict 
at trial which was affirmed. On appeal, defendants sought 
to distinguish a ladder case from an automobile case. The 
Court indicated that it was simply a question whether injury 
to a person in the position of the deceased was foreseeable. 
Strict liability is not limited to products that are inherently 
dangerous. In fact, in Elmore, the Court thought that by-
standers should be entitled to even greater protection than 
users when injury to them is foreseeable. In these cases, 
privity thinking plays no part. Foreseeability of harm to by-
standers is an issue for the trier of fact. It is immaterial that 
the precise manner in which the injury came about was not 
clearly foreseeable, because the exact or particular chain of 
events in the occurrence does not overthrow the end result if it 
was reasonably foreseeable. The bystander, however, must 
supply the same proof as the user. He must show that the 
product was used normally and for its intended use. It did 
appear that the ladder was upright, but with its rails more than 
four feet from the wall against which it stood. Everyone 
knows that ladders will slide away from the wall if used at an 
improper angle. There was conflicting evidence on the ques-
tion of improper use which, being a question of fact, was solely 
within the province of the jury. Improper use would not 
necessarily be effective to bar the right to recover if it were 
shown such use most probably resulted from a failure to warn, 
and that the method of use was reasonably foreseeable. Here, 
the Court emphasizes that no warnings were given. 5 
The doctrine was extended to a lessor of personal property 
in the case of McCla{iin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co.6 
This was another ladder case where death resulted. Decedent 
was a self-employed installer of draperies. There were some 
5. The failure to warn as a defect 
was also emphasized in Barth v. B. F. 
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App.2d 
228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968). In fact, 
318 
the failure to warn about the danger of 
overloading the tires was the defect. 
6. 274 Cal. App. 2d '-, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
337 (1969). 
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vertical cracks in one of the step-bearing legs of the ladder, 
which caused the ladder to collapse while plaintiff was using 
it. Defendants claimed that the cracks were caused by plain-
tiff's improper use of the ladder and, alternately, that if the 
cracks existed at the time of rental, plaintiff knew about them 
and therefore assumed the risk. Plaintiffs sought an instruc-
tion on strict liability that was refused, and defendant pre-
vailed. On appeal, the Court agreed with plaintiff's conten-
tion that the refusal to so instruct was improper and reversed. 
The Court took the position that Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc. 7 overthrew the doctrine of warranty as a basis 
to impose liability on a purveyor of a defective chattel. War-
ranty is now overboard, so that the liability is no longer based 
on contract. Strict liability can now rest on a liability entirely 
free of the contractual relationship or privity. Reliance was 
placed on Elmore8 and Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co. 9 De-
fendants sought to make the decedent a lessee-bailee, and as 
such not entitled to the benefit of strict liability. The Court 
pointed out that strict liability had been extended to a retail 
buyer, a buyer's employee, and a mere bystander, unconnected 
with the chattel's purveyor except as an ultimate victim. Les-
sors are engaged in distributing goods to the public, and are 
an integral part of the overall marketing enterprise, therefore 
they should bear the cost of injuries resulting from the proper 
use of the defective products that they place in the stream 
of commerce.10 
The stream of commerce is being enlarged to include all 
those who participate in the marketing of a product. The 
previously mentioned Goodrich case held that installers of the 
tires were also subject to strict liability even though they were 
not true sellers. 
In last year's article, we asked the question whether res ipsa 
loquitur could be used in connection with establishing strict 
7. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963). 
8. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 
70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 
P.2d 84 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 
9. 265 Cal. App.2d 228, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 306 (1968). 
10. Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing 
and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Torts 
liability.ll It was thought that some cases mentioned that this 
was a possibility.12 In such cases, inferences as to the liability 
of the manufacturer could be made from the circumstances as 
well as by res ipsa loquitur, but, of course, res ipsa could be 
limited to proving ordinary negligence. 
In the case of Tresham v. Ford Motor CO.,t3 this possible 
uncertainty was resolved. Inferring a defect in design and 
manufacture from circumstances is different from inferring 
negligence when applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In 
strict liability cases, the liability is not based on negligence at 
all. Strict liability evolved from the warranty concept with 
which res ipsa loquitur has no connection.14 It follows that 
when a plaintiff seeks to impose strict liability, the requirement 
of showing a defect cannot be satisfied by reliance on res ipsa 
loquitur. But the fact remains that inferences are made in 
both strict liability and in negligence cases. Tresham is a 
good opinion clarifying the issues in both types of cases. It 
indicates that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is limited to the 
negligence issue only.ls 
D. Nondelegable Duty 
In Maloney v. Rath,t6 a simple set of facts led to clarifica-
tion of an automobile owner's obligation to maintain his car 
in such condition that it satisfies all statutory requirements, 
and thereby assures the safety of other road users. Plaintiff 
stopped in the left lane of a highway and waited to make a left 
turn. Defendant came from behind and, because of a sudden 
unexpected failure of her brakes, rear-ended plaintiff's car 
and caused injuries to the plaintiff and to plaintiff's car. Plain-
tiff sued for damages. After a verdict for defendant, because 
the explanation showed defendant was not at fault, plaintiff 
11. Moreau, TORTS, Cal Law -
Trends and Developments 1969, p. 405. 
12. Ghema v. Ford Motor Co., 246 
Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 
(1966). 
13. 275 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr. 
883 (1969). 
320 
14. See Trust v Arden Farms Co., 50 
Cal.2d 217, 324 P.2d 583, 81 A.L.R.2d 
332 (1958). 
15. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 883 (1969). 
16. 69 Cal.2d 442, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968). 
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moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; the court 
denied it. Plaintiff appealed. 
Defendant explained the accident occurred because of a 
rubbing of a wheel on the brake line, weakening it, allowing 
it to rupture suddenly on application of the brakes and causing 
an immediate loss of braking power. She had had the brakes 
fully overhauled three months earlier by a good mechanic, 
and they were examined again two weeks before the accident. 
Defendant was assured by her mechanic, an independent con-
tractor, that her brakes were in excellent condition. She also 
explained that she had no notice of the impending failure, as 
it occurred suddenly without prior indication of malfunction. 
On the theory that this negatived failure to exercise care with 
reference to the requirements of the then existing Vehicle 
Code section 26300, and section 26453, as to brakes and 
equipment, defendant was not held liable. The defendant 
argued that she had done all that could be expected of a per-
son of ordinary prudence. Defendant was relying on Alarid v. 
Vanier,17 which refused to apply strict liability under similar 
circumstances. Plaintiff asked the Court to reconsider its deci-
sion in Alarid and impose strict liability on the defendant. 
Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the Court, adhered to the 
Alarid decision, refusing to apply the strict liability rule to 
such cases, but nevertheless held the defendant liable on the 
theory that she was under a nondelegable duty to keep her 
automobile equipped as required by the Vehicle Code. The 
opinion is documented with some seven situations where 
California has held parties liable under duties which were not 
delegable. IS 
Sections 423 and 424 of the Restatement of Torts support 
17. 50 Ca1.2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 
(1958). 
18. These include (a) where a party 
is given a franchise by public authority; 
(b) a condemning agent must protect a 
severed parcel from damage; (c) a gen-
eral contractor has a nondelegable duty 
to construct a building safely; (d) an 
owner retains a duty when hiring an in-
CAL LAW 1970 
dependent contractor jf there is danger 
of injury to others unless great precau-
tion is taken; (e) landlords have a duty 
to maintain their premises in a reason-
ably safe condition and (f) to comply 
with safety ordinances; (g) employers 
have a duty to comply with safety re-
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the holding in this case, especially section 423.19 Under this 
section the statutory duty is not delegable; the owner of the 
car remains liable. Such a duty is of the utmost importance to 
the public. 
There is, of course, considerable difference between this 
holding and one that would place defendant under a strict lia-
bility. Probably the most important difference is that defenses 
applicable to a negligence action will remain; both contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk are available to the 
defendant. Also, no doubt, if defendant pays, she will be 
entitled to indemnity from her contractor for his breach of 
contract or for his negligent failure to discover what a reason-
able inspection would have revealed. 
This is a policy decision highly beneficial to the public. As 
between the plaintiff, who has not been at fault at all, and the 
defendant, whose defective equipment caused the damage, it is 
more just that defendant should make the plaintiff whole, even 
though the defendant was not actively at fault. 
The nondelegable duty is well grounded in our law. It is 
not new. In 1935, a New York court noted the general rule 
that one who hired a contractor to do work for him was not 
liable for the negligence of such independent contractor.20 It 
added, however, that there are so many exceptions to the rule 
that the rule itself no longer exists. It originated prior to the 
industrial revolution. The opinion of the Court in Maloney 
proves that the exceptions practically nullify the rule. And we 
can expect more such exceptions. Probably the best study 
of the problem was made by Professor Steffen in his study 
titled "Independent Contractor and the Good Life,"l made in 
19. Section 423 of the Restatement 
of Torts states: 
"One who carries on an activity which 
threatens a grave risk of serious bodily 
harm or death unless the instrumental-
ities used are carefully constructed and 
maintained, and who employs an inde-
pendent contractor to construct or main-
tain those instrumentalities is subject to 
the same liability for physical harm 
322 
caused by the negligence of the contrac-
tor in constructing or maintaining such 
instrumentalities as though the employ-
er himself had done the work of con-
struction and maintenance." 
20. Kuhn v. P. J. Carlin Const. Co., 
154 Misc. 892, 278 N.Y.S. 635 (1935). 
1. 2 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. pp. 501-
532 (1934-35). 
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1933. His capacity to dissect and lay bare so-called well ac-
cepted doctrine is refreshing indeed. 
In the later case of Clark v. Dziabas, 2 another case involving 
defective brakes, the State Supreme Court clarified the holding 
of the Maloney case. The Court stated that in order to es-
tablish a defense to liability for damages caused by a brake 
failure, the owner must establish two things: (a) that he did 
what would be expected of a reasonably prudent person under 
the circumstances and (b) that the employees or independent 
contractors to whom the inspection was delegated were not 
negligent. In other words, the Maloney case does not impose 
an absolute liability. In Maloney the contractors were neg-
ligent. If neither the owner nor his agents are negligent there 
is no liability. In Clark, the defendant had rebutted his own 
negligence, but not that of his agents. For this reason, the 
trial court committed error in denying plaintiff's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding a verdict for the defendant. Plain-
tiff was granted a new trial. On retrial, the defendant will 
have an opportunity to establish that the defect in the brakes 
was there when he purchased the car and that a careful inspec-
tion by his agents would not have revealed the defect. In that 
event, the breach of the nondelegable duty would not be 
proved. 
III. Interspousal Imputation of Negligence 
A. In General 
Interspousal imputation of negligence in California has un-
dergone so many judicial and legislative modifications that a 
developmental overview is perhaps the best method of bringing 
this subject up to date. 
The effect of imputation of negligence is either to create a 
liability or to impose a disability. That portion of the doc-
trine which creates a vicarious liability, as in the case of the 
master being responsible for the torts of his servant, has found 
.2. 69 Cal.2d 449, 71 Cal. Rptr. 901, 
445 P.2d 517 (1968); Dutcher v. Weber, 
275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 378. 
CAL LAW 1970 323 
17
Moreau: Torts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Torts 
favor in modern tort law as a means of allocating risk to those 
in a more favorable position to either bear the financial burden 
or pass it on to the community at large.s On the other hand, 
that branch of the doctrine which imposes a disability by im-
puting contributory negligence to defeat the claim of an other-
wise innocent person has generally been viewed with disfavor 
by both the courts and legislatures. 
The community property system, which generally works to 
protect and preserve the property rights of the wife, has tradi-
tionally posed special problems in the area of tort recovery. 
The fault rationale of tort law and the concepts of community 
property combined to deny recovery to an innocent wife in-
jured as a result of the concurring negligence of her husband 
and a third party, since a wrongdoing spouse would otherwise 
be unjustly enriched by his community share of the recovery. 
Consequently, both the cause of action and damages recovered 
for personal injury to either the husband or wife were held 
to be community property, and the negligence of one spouse 
was imputed to the other to bar recovery.4 Past legislation, by 
dealing with specific inequities without affecting the source 
of these problems, has been much like plugging holes in a dike, 
merely suppressing a particular symptom only to have it re-
appear in a different form. It now appears a new and better 
dike has been built. 
B. A Brief Historical Perspective 
Since a wrongdoer sharing in a recovery offended traditional 
negligence thinking, dissolution of the community provided a 
logical basis for refusing to impose the doctrine. Consequent-
ly, in 1952, it was held that where the negligent spouse had 
died and could no longer benefit from his own wrong, the im-
putation of negligence rule would not apply.5 Four years 
later, a similar rule was announced where the community was 
dissolved by divorce, the court holding that a spouse's entire 
3. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d ed., p. en, 33 Ca1.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R. 
471. 2d 461 (1949). 
4. Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 5. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 
273 P2d 257 (1954); Zaragosa v. Crav- 248 P.2d 922 (1952). 
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cause of action vested by operation of law and could not be 
dealt with by a divorce court.6 An effort to achieve a similar 
result by the negligent spouse's release of his community 
property interest in any recovery, making such the separate 
property of the innocent spouse, was held ineffective to prevent 
application of the doctrine where such agreement was reached 
after the cause of action arose. 7 However, where the wife was 
living separate from the husband when the cause of action 
arose, with no intention of resuming the marital relationship, 
it was held that the then existing Civil Code section 169 makes 
such cause of action the separate property of the wife.8 
In 1957, the legislature attempted to remedy the inequities 
created by the clash of tort and community property concepts 
by adding section 163.5 to the Civil Code, which made "all 
damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a 
civil action for personal injuries . . . the separate property 
of such married person."9 The effect of this statutory change 
was far from being as pervasively corrective as intended and, 
as subsequently demonstrated, it wrought its own brand of 
injustice. 
Vehicle Code section 17150, which imputed the negligence 
of the permissive user of an automobile to its owner/a was 
perhaps the most significant reason why Civil Code section 
163.5 had only limited success. The term owner, by defini-
tion, extends beyond the limitations of record title. Since 
most vehicles acquired during the marriage are community 
property, a strict construction of Vehicle Code section 17150 
would, in the majority of instances, result in the imputation of 
negligence of husband-driver upon the injured wife-passenger. 
This contention was rejected in Shepardson v. McLellan ll 
where the automobile, although admittedly community prop-
6. Washington v. Washington, 47 Cal. Ch. 2334; repealed Stats. 1969, Ch. 
2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956). 1608, § 3. 
7. Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 10. Vehicle Code § 17150, Stats. 
P.2d 257 (1954). 1957, Ch. 3. 
8. Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal. App. 11. 59 Cal.2d 83, 27 Cal. Rptr. 884, 
2d 46, 222 P.2d 891 (1950). 378 P.2d 108 (1963). 
9. Civ. Code § 163.5, Stats. 1957, 
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erty, was registered solely to the husband whose contributory 
negligence the defendant sought to impute to the wife-pas-
senger to bar the recovery she was seeking for her injuries. 
The Court in explaining its refusal to impute the husband's 
negligence to the wife stated: 
. because the husband has control and manage-
ment of the community property, no consent of the wife, 
express or implied, to his use of the community vehicle 
registered in his name, can add anything to his existing 
right to use the vehicle; . . .12 
Imputation of negligence could be found when title to the 
vehicle was recorded in both names because of the presump-
tion of Civil Code section 164 that property acquired by an 
instrument in writing by a married woman is her separate 
property.13 In Cooke v. Tsipouroglou14 the trial court's denial 
of recovery sought by an injured passenger-wife was affirmed 
even though both plaintiff and her husband had testified that 
it was their intention to hold the vehicle as community prop-
erty. The certificate of ownership listed the registered owner 
as "Cooke, Jack or Margaret." The Court found the tes-
timony of plaintiff and her husband merely created a conflict 
which the trial court was free to resolve against plaintiff. In 
other words, following the presumption created by Civil Code 
section 164, in the absence of any specific designation on the 
certificate of ownership as to how title was held, the Court 
accepted the trial court's finding that the automobile was not 
community property but rather that it was held by a tenancy-
in-common. The consequence of this form of ownership is a 
right of management and control existing in the wife which 
would not exist if the vehicle were held as community property. 
It is the right of management and control which carries with it 
the burden of imputation of negligence under Vehicle Code 
section 17150. Hence, a determination of the nature of own-
12. 59 Cal.2d 83, 87, 27 Cal. Rptr. 14. 59 Cal.2d 660, 31 Cal. Rptr. 60, 
884, 887, 378 P.2d 108, 111. 381 P.2d 940 (1963). 
13. Civ. Code § 164, amended by 
Stats. 1927, Ch. 487, § 1; p. 826; re-
pealed Stats. 1969, Ch. 1608, § 3. 
326 CAL LAW 1970 20
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/11
Torts 
ership is vital where a defendant seeks to impute the contribu-
tory negligence of the driver-spouse to the passenger-spouse. 
Of the four types of ownership-separate, community, ten-
ancy-in-common, and joint tenancy-only community owner-
ship is free of the burden of imputation of negligence where 
the accident occurred prior to 1967.15 
Shifting their attention to the Vehicle Code, the legislature 
made two more attempts to complete the task they started in 
1957. In 1965, they added section 17150.5, which made 
the presumptions created by Civil Code section 164 inap-
plicable to an action based on Vehicle Code section 17150 
with respect to the ownership of a motor vehicle by a married 
woman and her husband.16 This attempt to remedy the situa-
tion which arose in Cooke fell short of its intended mark and 
negligence was still imputed where the ownership was clearly 
other than community. The same section was again amended 
in 1967,17 for the express purpose of preventing the imputation 
of the driver's contributory negligence to an otherwise in-
nocent owner in order to defeat the owner's claim for damages 
against a negligent third party. IS This was accomplished by 
deleting the words ". . . shall be imputed to the owner for 
all purposes of civil damages." This amendment does, how-
ever, preserve the protection afforded those damaged by the 
negligence of permissive users by imposing financial liability 
on the owners of vehicles without the necessity of resorting 
to the artifice of imputing negligence. 
In 1968, the legislature made two particularly significant 
statutory changes. First, Civil Code section 163.5, now re-
pealed, was amended to again return personal injury recoveries 
15. Hooper v. Romero, 262 Cal. App. 
2d 574, 68 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1968). 
16. Vehicle Code § 17150.5, added 
by Stats. 1965, Ch. 1598, § 1. 
17. Vehicle Code § 17150, amended 
by Stats. 1967, Ch. 702, § 1. 
18. Legislative Committee Comment 
in Senate makes this intent abundantly 
clear: ". . . The last clause of § 
17150 has been deleted because it, to-
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gether with § 17158, prevented an inno-
cent vehicle owner from recovering any 
damages for a personal injury caused 
by the concurring negligence of his 
driver and a third person. Instead of 
barring an owner's cause of action in 
such a case, § 17150 as amended permits 
him to recover his damages from the 
negligent third person." Vehicle Code 
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by either spouse to community property status.19 Second, in 
order to prevent a return to the interspousal imputation of neg-
ligence originally dictated by the community property status 
of such recoveries, Civil Code section 164.6 was enacted, 
though now repealed, eliminating the concurring negligence 
of the other spouse as a defense to an action brought by the 
injured spouse against a third party except". . in cases 
where such concurring negligent or wrongful act or omission 
would be a defense if the marriage would not exist."20 
The earlier legislative preoccupation with negativing the 
effect of imputing negligence to the innocent spouse had, per-
haps, limited its vision as to the ultimate reach of Civil Code 
section 163.5, now repealed, which extended beyond the situa-
tion involving the other spouse's contributory negligence. 
Personal injuries frequently mean large medical bills paid from 
community resources and an impairment of earning capacity, 
often the most significant community asset. Section 163.5 
made no allowance for reimbursement to the community for 
these losses, even in situations where the other spouse was in 
no way involved in causation of the injury. Consequently, al-
though the injury might result in a substantial depletion 
of community assets, the recovery, being the separate property 
of the injured spouse, was subject to that spouse's unrestricted 
disposition. The hardship imposed on the marital partner be-
came particularly apparent in the division of property on dis-
solution of the marriage by death or divorce. 1 
Civil Code section 163.5, as amended, provided that per-
sonal injury recoveries were separate property only when paid 
by the other spouse. This had the effect of preserving the right 
of one spouse to sue the other for civil wrongs. All other re-
coveries are community property. 
Although neither Vehicle Code section 17150 as amended 
in 1967, nor Civil Code section 164.6 as added in 1968, but 
19. Stats. 1968, Chs. 457, 458, pp. cent changes in community property 
1077-1080. law, see Sammis, COMMUNITY PROPER-
20. Stats 1968, Ch. 457, § 3. TY AND FAMILY LAW, Cal Law -
1. For a more detailed discussion of Trends and Developments 1969, pp. 
these sections and others relating to re- 347-371. 
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now repealed, have been tested at the appellate level, it would 
appear that the legislature has, at last, achieved success by 
the simple, direct approach of restricting the use of the doc-
trine of imputation of negligence rather than further attempts 
at restructuring the community property system. 
C. A Brief Summary 
Prior to 1957, the contributory negligence of the husband 
could be imputed to an otherwise innocent wife to defeat her 
personal injury cause of action, because the recovery she might 
obtain would be shared by the community. From 1957 
through 1967, although personal injury recoveries became the 
separate property of the injured spouse, the contributory negli-
gence of the husband in an automobile accident could still be 
imputed to the wife to defeat her claim if her ownership of the 
vehicle could be shown to be other than ownership as commu-
nity property. In other words, if she held separate title or held 
as a tentant-in-common or in joint tenancy with her husband, 
negligence had to be imputed by operation of Vehicle Code 
section 17150. The defendant's burden of showing separate 
ownership was easier prior to 1965, when he could invoke the 
presumptions of now repealed Civil Code section 164. The 
exceptions to the pre-1957 dictates of imputing contributory 
negligence because of the community property status of the 
recovery were: (1) dissolution of the marriage by death or 
divorce, (2) the wife living separate from her husband when 
the cause of action arose and (3) possibly an agreement, mak-
ing personal injury recoveries the separate property of each 
spouse, executed before the cause of action arose. 2 In 1968, 
Vehicle Code section 17150, as amended, became effective, 
preventing imputation of the permissive user's contributory 
negligence to defeat the claim of an otherwise innocent 
owner. 
In 1969, Civil Code section 164.6, although already re-
pealed, was to have become effective and expressly forbid de-
feasance of the injured spouse's third-party action based on the 
2. This is the implication of Kesler (1954). There have been no subse-
v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 quent cases directly on this point. 
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contributory negligence of the other spouse, except where such 
concurring negligence or wrongful act or omission would be 
a defense if the marriage did not exist. 
IV. Workmen's Compensation v. Tort Liability Under Re-
spondeat Superior 
A. The Going and Coming Rule 
If an employee injures a third person while driving to and 
from the job site, it is often difficult to decide whether the 
employee was in the course of his employment so as to make 
the employer, as well as the employee, liable to the injured 
party. This was the situation in Harris v. Oro-Dam Construc-
tors.3 The jury returned a verdict against the defendant driver 
Byers, but in favor of the defendant employer, on the basis that 
the employee was not on the job. The plaintiff appealed. 
Byers, the employee, lived 23 miles from the job site and 
received a daily stipend of $6.00 as a transportation allow-
ance, but the allowance did not cover travel time. The so-
called going and corning rule limits liability under respondeat 
superior to on-site liability of the employer. The employer-' 
employee relationship is suspended when the employee leaves 
for horne, for it is said that he is no longer in the scope of 
his employment. The Court affirmed on the basis that the 
driving was principally for the benefit of the employee and only 
tangentially for the benefit of the employer, and further that 
the employer had no control over the employee during the 
driving. These two words then, benefit and control form the 
basis of the decision. The opinion emphasizes that in this 
type of a case the question is one of fault, and is therefore dis-
tinguishable from the workmen's compensation cases where 
the question is one of compensation, and is a matter that in-
volves whether the injury occurs or arises "out of and in the 
course of employment." 
Plaintiff relied on those compensation cases which recognize 
certain exceptions to the going and corning rule. If the 
3. 269 Cal. App.2d 911, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 544 (1969). 
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employer expects the employee to drive his own car to work, 
any injury during the driving to and from work is employment-
connected and is therefore compensable. The trip is indirectly 
beneficial to the employer, and so the suspension of the rela-
tionship is not indicated. 
The most recent case on the workmen's compensation ex-
ception to the going and coming rule is Zenith National Insur-
ance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.4 Here 
the employee sustained serious injuries while enroute to the 
job site 130 miles from his home. Justice Tobriner points out 
that California has no statute on the subject matter which 
would deny compensation, but that the decisions have applied 
a similar rule. 5 The rule is premised on the theory that the 
relationship of employer and employee is suspended from the 
time he leaves his work. Justice Tobriner then indicates that 
the relationship may be found to continue on particular facts. 
Here the facts consisted of (a) the great distance-130 miles, 
(b) the employer's compensating the employee $10 a day 
to cover transportation costs and living expenses, (c) the 
employer's furnishing transportation when the employee was 
unable to arrange it and (d) the extra payment as an induce-
ment to the worker to take the job. These facts were deemed 
to justify the conclusion that the injuries arose "out of and 
in the course of employment." 
Certainly these two cases bring the problem of creating a 
liability to third parties by respondeat superior, and of com-
pensating employees for injuries received during travel time, 
into an interesting contrast. Tort liability is one thing, but 
compensation for an employee quite another. Tort requires 
fault, but compensation for work-incurred injury is usually 
made irrespective of fault. Fault is almost always immate-
rial in workmen's compensation cases. Yet if the employer 
is at fault also, what he pays his employee under the dictates 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act is deductible from any 
recovery as damages from any third person who happens to 
4. 66 Cal.2d 944, 59 Cal. Rptr. 622, 5. Kobe v. Industrial Ace. Com., 35 
428 P.2d 606 (1967). Cal.2d 33, 215 P.2d 736 (1950). 
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be liable also. 6 Yet the employer, if not at fault, gets indem-
nity for his payments from the wrongdoer.7 
It will be interesting to observe whether the workmen's 
compensation exception to the going and coming rule will 
eventually be extended to encompass liability to third parties. 
V. Indemnity 
A. In General 
As observed in last year's article,S indemnity is a shifting 
of an entire liability from one party to another. It differs 
from contribution, which is a sharing of liability between 
parties held jointly liable. Generally, there are two types 
of indemnity, contractual and noncontractual; the former is 
based on the agreement of the parties, the latter is implied 
by law. The extent of liability in contract cases is governed 
basically by contract law although such contracts are often 
connected with tort cases. 
B. Contractual Indemnity 
Within the policy limits, the standard automobile liability 
insurance policy provides for indemnity to be paid by the 
insurance carrier to the assured for whatever amounts are 
due from the assured to an injured party. Cases like Davidson 
v. Welch 9 demonstrate how complex these relationships can 
become. Welch owned and operated an automobile repair 
shop which he leased to Davidson, and agreed with Davidson 
to continue its operation, as Davidson's employee. As such, 
Welch became an owner-lessor-employee, and Davidson be-
came a lessee-employer. The lessee had agreed to save the 
lessor harmless in his relationship with the public in conduct-
ing the business. So when Welch, the lessor-employee, had 
6. De Cruz v. Reid, 69 Cal.2d 217, 676 (1969); also see Price v. Shell Oil 
70 Cal. Rptr. 550, 444 P.2d 342 (1968). Company, 272 A.C.A. 420, 77 Cal. 
7. Lab. Code § 3852. Rptr. 475 (1969); rehearing granted. 
8. Moreau, TORTS, Cal Law-Trends For further discussion of the former 
and Developments 1969, pp. 414-420. case, see Rohwer, CONTRACTS, in this 
9. 270 Cal. App.2d 220, 75 Cal. Rptr. volume. 
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an altercation with a customer and the customer sued Welch, 
Welch, in his capacity as lessor of the business, was entitled to 
have Davidson and his insurer defend the suit unless, of 
course, Welch, in his capacity as an employee, was guilty of a 
wilful act in striking the customer. If what he did was in 
the course of the employment, the insurance contract would 
inure to the benefit of Welch. Here tort and contract went 
hand in hand. The Court observed that generally the 
employer is entitled to indemnity from his employee if he 
has to pay damages for the negligence of his employee. 
Here, however, the situation was reversed, for the employee 
was seeking indemnity from the employer and his insurer on 
the basis of the lease agreement. The Court allowed the in-
demnity, since the conduct of the employee was found to be 
in the course of the employment. 
For an extreme case allowing indemnity or subrogation 
on a contractual basis, see Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon. 10 
Here jewelry was consigned to defendants under an agree-
ment which placed all loss on defendants. The jewelry was 
stolen without any fault of the defendants. Koulish's insurer 
paid the loss and then Koulish and the insurer sued defend-
ants for indemnity and recovered. Ordinarily, a paid insurer 
is not entitled to reimbursement from someone not at fault. ll 
The Koulish case is severely criticized in a more recent case,12 
in which the Supreme Court denied a hearing, thus reaffirming 
Meyers v. Bank of America/3 which refused to allow an in-
surer for a fee to be subrogated to the rights of its insured 
against a party who, though innocent of fault, was technically 
liable (i.e., as in the case of an innocent purchaser for value 
from a thief-in such cases the courts treat the paid insurer 
and the innocent converter as having equal equities, thus 
refusing to aid either one). Koulish indicates that contractual 
indemnity, regardless of fault, can lead to inequitable results. 
10. 213 Cal. App.2d 419, 28 Cal. 
Rptr. 757 (1963). 
11. Meyers v. Bank of America Nat. 
Trust & Savings Assn., 11 Cal.2d 92, 
77 P.2d 1084 (1938). 
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C. Implied Indemnity 
In tort, we are primarily concerned with noncontractual 
indemnity, that is, the implied indemnity created by equity 
and brought about by or obtained by subrogation or an action 
seeking indemnity. These cases usually arise where there is 
a special relationship between the indemnitor and the in-
demnitee, such as principal and agent, employee and employer, 
partner and partner, or a party who when under a nondelega-
ble duty employs a contractor to do the work for him, and 
also where a party permits someone to drive his car who in-
jures a third person. When the permittor (owner) pays the 
injured person he is entitled to indemnity from the permittee 
(driver) . These cases are simple enough. The party paying 
the loss must do so not because of any personal negligence, 
but because the law dictates his responsibility either by stat-
ute, imputation of negligence or the nondelegable duty. The 
relationship of the party paying the loss to the one whose active 
negligence caused the loss dictates that restitution should be 
granted. The one seeking indemnity has simply conferred 
a benefit on the indemnitor in having paid an obligation of 
such person. Removing a liability is clearly a benefit. 
In City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing,14 decided 
in 1958, a case not involving an employer-employee situation 
nor any relationship between the parties was presented. The 
City of San Francisco is required to keep its streets safe for 
the public. Ho Sing, a businessman, made changes in the 
street paving in front of his place of business, and rendered 
the street unsafe for pedestrians. A pedestrian was injured 
and sued both the city and Ho Sing, securing a joint judgment 
against both. The city paid half of the judgment and sued to 
recover its payment from Ho Sing, thus seeking to place the 
whole loss on Ho Sing. The Court allowed the suit for indem-
nity on the basis that the change of the condition of the street 
was made solely for the benefit of the private owner, and 
therefore the party who created the condition should indemnify 
14. 51 Cal.2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
(1958); this case was also discussed in 1969, p. 415. 
last year's article. Moreau, TORTS, 
334 CAL LAW 1970 28
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/11
Torts 
the city, which became liable for failure to remove the danger 
when it had notice of the condition. At the same time, the 
Court recognized that the duty of the city was not dependent 
on, nor derivative from, the liability of the private owner as 
in the employer-employee cases. The city was jointly and 
severally liable with the private owner. What the Court did 
here was to distinguish positive wrongdoing from negative 
wrongdoing, or rather active conduct from mere failure to 
act, sins of commission from those of omission. 
This is the point where the two dissenting justices, Schauer 
and McComb, departed from their brethren, like Episco-
palians who repeat the confession of having not only done 
the things they should not have done, but also having not 
done things they should have done. The latter is just as bad 
as the former. Both types of wrongdoing are equal before 
the law; therefore, the dissenters argued, the parties were liable 
jointly and severally, and were equally liable for the injuries 
that resulted. The majority recognized the strength of the 
argument, but still allowed indemnity. Perhaps the real basis 
for the holding was equitable considerations; without indem-
nity there would have been enrichment of the private owner at 
the expense of the city or the public. Such enrichment was 
unjust, and gave rise to an implied promise to make payment 
of all the damage suffered. 
Contribution and implied indemnity are both remedies for 
achieving substantial justice between those who are, in the 
eyes of the law, wrongdoers. As between the two remedies, 
indemnity is by far the more drastic. Whereas contribution 
spreads the loss between two or more tortfeasors, indemnity 
shifts the entire loss from one to the other. At common law 
there was no right of contribution between persons jointly or 
severally liable. It was not until 1957 that our legislature 
enacted a contribution statute. 15 The Ho Sing case, decided 
in 1958, recognized the right to implied indemnity. Whereas 
the remedy of contribution is restricted statutorily,16 the right 
15. Code of Civ. Proc. § 875. et. seq. 
16. Part (a) of c.c.P. § 875 requires 
a H. • • money jlldgment . . . 
rendered jointly against tl\'O or more 
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to implied indemnity is not confined by statute, and conse-
quently has enjoyed a general liberalization of availability. 
Since Ho Sing, those whose liability was only secondary 
have routinely been allowed indemnity from those primarily 
liable, as have those whose negligence was characterized as 
only passive been granted recovery from those whose active 
negligence created the harm.l7 Although distinguishing be-
tween active and passive negligence has given our courts no 
small amount of difficulty /8 such is not the focus of our present 
case analysis. Recent decisions have directed our attention to 
the question of whether a difference in the degree of negli-
gence or a disparity of culpability between tortfeasors is to 
be accepted in California as a basis for granting implied in-
demnity. 
Section 96 of the Restatement of Restitution, allows in-
demnity to one who without personal fault has been com-
pelled to defray expenses caused to a third person by the 
unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another. The under-
lying reasons are stated in other language by Professor Pros-
ser, as involving (a) the community feeling or opinion as to 
whether justice dictates the restitution to one tortfeasor as 
against another, or (b) because of the relation of the parties 
to one another or (c) perhaps because there is a real difference 
in the degree of culpability of the parties. l9 
choose where to place the entire loss 
in circumstances where two or more 
wrongdoers would be jointly or sever-
ally liable for the victim's damage; the 
statute makes no provision for a de-
fendant to interplead another wrong-
doer whom plaintiff has either over-
looked or knowingly chose not to sue. 
Part (c) requires discharge of the 
joint judgment by the party seeking con-
tribution. 
Part (d) denies the right of contribu-
tion to the tortfeasor who has intention-
ally injured another. 
17. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. 
App.2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 8 A.L.R. 
3d 629 (1964); Pierce v. Turner, 205 
Cal. App.2d 264, 23 Cal. Rptr. 115 
336 
(1962); Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina 
Co., 208 Cal. App.2d 367, 25 Cal Rptr. 
301 (1962); American Can Co. v. City 
and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. 
App.2d 520, 21 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1962). 
18. For an excellent discussion of 
this area of the problem, see Cahill 
Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. 
App.2d 367, 381, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 
309 (1962). 
19. Prosser, Law 0/ Torts, 3rd ed., p. 
281. See also Bohlen, Contribution and 
Indemnity Between Tort/easors, 21 
Corn. L.Q. 552 (1935-36); Hodges, 
Contribution and Indemnity Among 
Tort/easors, 26 Texas L. Rev. p. 150 
(1947-48). 
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In the 1961 Wisconsin case of Jacobs v. General Accident 
Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,20 the Court held that a tort-
feasor guilty of only simple negligence could not get indemnity 
from another tortfeasor who was grossly negligent. The 
Court held there was no injustice in imposing some of the 
burden of compensation on one whose negligence had directly 
contributed to the loss suffered. 
We now consider two California cases concerning whether 
the degree of culpability is a sound basis for shifting losses 
where the losses were paid by one whose degree of culpa-
bility was less than that of the other wrongdoer. In Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lan Franco/ a collision 
occurred between a Santa Fe passenger train and a truck 
owned by Whitehead Construction Company and driven by 
Lan Franco. Plaintiff, a passenger on the train, was injured 
and sued three parties: the Santa Fe Railway, the Whitehead 
Construction Company and the estate of the decedent driver 
of the truck. Santa Fe filed a cross complaint against the 
construction company for indemnity in the event it was held 
liable. The Court dismissed the cross complaint and an appeal 
was taken from the dismissal. As stated by Justice Kerrigan 
of the Court of Appeal, the issue was where to allocate the loss. 
Here, as between Santa Fe and the construction company, 
there was no relationship, contractual or otherwise, so it was 
a clear case of implied indemnity if there were to be indemnity 
at all. Santa Fe sought indemnity on the basis that its duty 
towards the injured parties was of a different character and 
degree from the duty owed by the construction company. The 
duty of Santa Fe, as a common carrier, was to exercise the 
highest degree of care, whereas that of the construction com-
pany was to exercise ordinary care. The duty of the railway 
was higher and therefore it was liable if it breached its duty 
of utmost care. On the other hand, the construction company 
was liable if it failed to exercise ordinary care. Accordingly, 
Santa Fe argued that its liability derived from technical fault. 
They claimed to be only passively negligent, while the con-
20. 14 Wis.2d I, 109 N.W.2d 462, 1. 267 Cal. App.2d 881,73 Cal. Rptr. 
88 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1961). 660 (1968). 
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struction company was actively negligent. In other words, 
the railroad sought to ground its right of indemnity on the 
basis of comparative fault, that is, the relative responsibilities 
of the parties. 
Santa Fe relied for authority on the federal court case of 
United Airlines v. Wiener.2 There two aircraft collided, one 
an Air Force jet and the other a commercial airliner. The 
argument was made that the commercial airline company 
owed the same high degree of care to its passengers as Santa 
Fe, and that the Air Force jet owed a duty of ordinary care 
to the passengers in the plane. In the airline case the United 
States Court of Appeals allowed indemnity to the airline from 
the United States. The Court said, 
In view of the disparity of duties, the clear disparity of 
culpability, the likely operation of the last clear chance 
doctrine and all the surrounding circumstances, . . . 
we hold that there are such differences in the contrasted 
character of fault as to warrant indemnity in favor of 
United [Airlines] . . .3 
Although the Court was sitting in California, it applied 
Nevada law, and as such, was only secondary authority when 
offered to support Santa Fe's position. 
The Court of Appeal, in an excellent opinion by Justice 
Kerrigan, took the position that the argument was based 
on the doctrine of comparative negligence, a doctrine not 
recognized at common law and not favored today except by 
law professors. This is different from our doctrine of primary 
and secondary negligence. The railroad company could not 
be held liable for Whitehead's wrongdoing, but would be liable 
for its own failure to exercise the care that the law exacted 
of it. The Court cited King v. Timber Structures, Inc.,4 and 
concluded that differences in the degree of negligence or com-
parative negligence are inconsequential under the law of equi-
table indemnity. 
2. 335 F.2d 379 (1964) Cert. Dis. in 379 U.S. 951, 13 L.Ed.2d 549, 85 S.Ct. 
379 U.S. 951, 13 L.Ed. 2d 549, 85 S.Ct. 452. 
452. 4. 240 Cal. App.2d 178, 49 Cal. Rptr. 
3. 335 F.2d 379, 402 Cert. Dis. in 414 (1966). 
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It is significant that another case arose out of this same col-
lision that was reviewed by the Court of Appeal, Second 
District, in which Justice Wood came to the same conclusion 
as did Justice Kerrigan in the Fourth District. 
We may hope to wrestle with a similar situation arising 
under our guest statute. If a guest is riding in an automobile 
which collides with another vehicle, and the driver of the car 
in which the guest is riding is intoxicated, making him liable 
under the guest statute, and the driver of the other car is guilty 
of only failing to exercise ordinary care, and a joint judgment 
is recovered against both-will the third party driver be 
entitled to indemnity from the intoxicated driver on the basis 
of the comparative degrees of culpability? If we can look 
from the highest degree of care to ordinary negligence, why not 
look from ordinary negligence to the lowest degree of care? 
No doubt this issue will eventually be decided by the State 
Supreme Court. We will then know whether disparity of 
culpability will eventually form an acceptable basis for indem-
nity. 
How can we justify the total shifting of a liability when we 
restrict the sharing of liability as we do? This complete 
shift finds similar thinking in our refusal to adopt a rule of 
comparative negligence. Under our present system, a plain-
tiff who is only slightly negligent sustains the burden of his 
losses. It resembles the doctrine of last clear chance, too, 
whereby a negligent person recovers all his damages from a 
defendant who was careless towards the negligent plaintiff by 
not preventing injury when he has a clear chance to do so. 
And this is true, also, where a superseding cause terminates the 
liability of a negligent actor completely, and shifts it to a later 
tortfeasor. It is a philosophy of "all or nothing." There is no 
sharing of burdens although equity has long considered that 
equality is equity. 
We can hope that the denial of indemnity where the degree 
of culpability varies will result in the adoption of the rule of 
contribution. The party who exercised the lesser degree of 
fault will then, at least, have the satisfaction of not having 
to pay all the loss. 
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A recent case that imposes a limitation on the law of in-
demnity is Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co. 5 Generally 
a retailer who becomes strictly liable, being in the chain of 
transfers in the sale of a defectively manufactured machine, is 
entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer for such pay-
ments as the retailer is required to pay to persons injured while 
properly using the machine. Here a new Ford automobile 
was put on the market with a faulty brake linkage system. 
Mrs. Schultz was seriously injured and a judgment for $150,-
000 was recovered against the manufacturing company and 
the dealer. The dealer cross complained for indemnity. The 
dealer had worked on the car to put it in condition and had 
failed to notice the defect while repairing a brake light switch 
located adjacent to the pin that was missing in the brake 
assembly. The Court of Appeal held that this failure on the 
part of the dealer made it an active tortfeasor and disentitled to 
indemnity. 
In conclusion, it seems advisable to point out that in all 
these indemnity cases there is one unifying principal, whether 
the claim is made pursuant to a contract or is based on impli-
cation. The one against whom indemnity is sought has been 
enriched by the payment. The question simply is whether he 
is unjustly enriched. If the thinking of society is that restitu-
tion should be made, the party seeking indemnity should win. 
Does the contract call for payment? Does the relation of the 
parties indicate that plaintiff paid the debt of another? Should 
the degree of culpability make a difference? Does the quality 
of the act call for repayment? The cases demonstrate judi-
cial thinking on the matter. 
VI. Abuse of Process 
In Templeton Feed and Grain Co. v. Ralston Purina CO.,6 
a clear picture of "abuse of process" was painted by Justice 
Tobriner. Both plaintiff and defendant were successful poul-
try feed vendors who expanded their operations by financing 
5. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 6. 69 Cal.2d 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344, 
279 (1969). 446 P.2d 152 (1968). 
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food producers such as the Livingstons who were large pro-
ducers of turkeys on two ranches, the Santa Margarita and 
the Arroyo Grande. For several years the Purina Company 
had been financing the Livingstons in their Margarita opera-
tion in sums in excess of $50,000, all secured by a mortgage 
on some 17,000 turkeys together "with replacements, increase, 
things confused therewith, and things of the same kind after-
wards acquired." These turkeys were said to be located on 
the Margarita ranch in Margarita township. This stated lo-
cation was made pursuant to former Civil Code section 2977, 
which was repealed when California enacted the Commercial 
Code. The prior statute controlled this case. The turkey 
operations were unsuccessful for several years, and the Living-
stons were in debt to the Purina Company in an amount in 
excess of $50,000. 
In 1964, Purina refused to continue the financing opera-
tions, so the Livingstons turned to the Templeton Company, 
which agreed to finance the raising of turkeys on the Living-
ston's Arroyo Grande ranch. Purina was informed of the 
new arrangement. In fact, representatives of both companies 
had agreed upon the arrangements. On this basis, Temple-
ton, in early 1964, delivered 110,000 poults to the Livingstons 
on their Arroyo ranch. In midsummer, Purina was casting 
longing eyes towards the large number of turkeys the Living-
stons had on their Arroyo ranch. Yet they knew that their 
mortgage of 1962, covered only turkeys located on the Mar-
garita ranch. 
On November 4, just when the market for turkeys was ap-
proaching the crucial Thanksgiving period, and there being 
turkeys on hand worth over $150,000, Purina filed suit in 
claim and delivery for the possession of some 35,000 turkeys 
pursuant to sections 509-511 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
In order to do this, it had to file an affidavit setting forth 
its right to possession. It did so relying on the after-acquired 
clause in its 1962 chattel mortgage. Pursuant to this process, 
it directed the sheriff to take possession of all the turkeys on 
the Arroyo ranch. Templeton, being thereby stymied in its 
purposes to sell on a market which would exist only for a 
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limited time, protected itself by paying off Purina's suit against 
Livingston in the sum of $53,098, and thus obtained a release 
of the claim on its turkeys. These are the facts which were 
presented to counsel for Templeton. 
The problem involved a matter of restitution; to obtain 
the return of the money paid to Purina. Abuse of process 
was just one of the remedies available. No doubt, counsel 
considered a suit for rescission of the contract made to obtain 
the release of the turkeys from the claim of Purina, on the 
theory that plaintiff's consent to the agreement was not freely 
given,' and also that Purina really gave nothing for the money 
paid as there was no right to those turkeys, there being thus 
a failure of consideration.s It was a clear case of economic 
duress as that term is described in Sistrom v. Anderson,9 and 
also of legal compulsion for the protection of its interests as 
in Wake Development Co. v. O'Leary.l0 Similar relief would 
have been available by a simple suit in quasi-contract, for 
money had and received.ll There was really nothing to be 
undone, as the release given did not give up anything of 
value which would have to be returned. Hence, there was no 
basis for going into equity, and a suit for money had and 
received, an action at law in form but equitable in substance, 
was quite adequate to do justice between the parties. 
All these remedies would have allowed the plaintiff to 
recover the money paid. However, viewing the facts as indi-
cating elements of intentional, unlawful conduct, bad faith, 
and malice, the attorney possibly or probably realized he might 
recover exemplary damages. What remedies would enable 
counsel to make this claim? Money had and received would 
7. Civ. Code §§ 1566, 1567. 
8. Civ. Code § 1689. 
9. 51 Cal. App.2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 
(1942). 
10. 118 Cal. App. 131, 4 P.2d 802 
(1931). This case is quite similar to 
Templeton in that the defendant ob-
tained a lien by levying execution, in-
stead of bringing a claim and delivery 
suit, and the execution was preventing 
342 
a sale of property, as in Templeton the 
sale of the turkeys was being delayed. 
The suit was for legal compulsion, how-
ever, instead of abuse of process, but 
the facts could have supported abuse of 
process. 
11. Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 
2d 512, 36 P.2d 635, 95 AL.R. 990 
(1934). 
CAL LAW 1970 36
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/11
Torts 
not do; nor would economic duress, unless it was extreme; 
nor would rescission unless pursuant to three recent cases 
which had not been decided while this case was being 
planned.12 [Under those cases, construing the amendments to 
the rescission statutes13 enacted in 1961, it is now possible to 
recover both consequential and even punitive damages.] Un-
der the circumstances, the remedy of "abuse of process" 
seemed to be the best basis on which to rest a claim for such 
damages, if the evidence pointed to the defendant's use of the 
claim and delivery process to coerce or extort money payments 
or other collateral advantages. Such a use is a perversion of 
a process. 
Accordingly, counsel brought suit for abuse of process, and 
also for money had and received, indicating that restitution 
was contemplated. Following the trial, the jury brought in 
a verdict for $110,000, thus obviously being impressed with 
the bad state of mind of the defendant in view of (a) the lim-
ited reach of defendant's mortgage to the Margarita ranch, 
(b) the knowledge on the part of the defendant that plaintiff 
was financing the operations on the Arroyo ranch, (c) knowl-
edge that its mortgage did not cover the subject turkeys, and 
(d) knowledge that plaintiff possessed an interest in the tur-
keys. From these facts the jury could infer that the process 
was used wilfully and for an ulterior purpose. The trial court, 
however, had not instructed on the allowance of punitive dam-
ages, and with this in mind it granted defendant's motion for a 
new trial unless plaintiff agreed to accept only $67,000. 
Plaintiff agreed to this condition (that gave it the return of 
its money but disallowing other damages). Defendant, how-
ever, insisted on appealing the judgment, feeling perhaps that 
any claim for punitive damages had been set at rest by the 
plaintiff's acceptance of the condition. When defendant con-
tinued its appeal, refusing to go along with the trial court's 
judgment, plaintiff considered its acceptance as no longer 
12. Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Mo- Cal. App.2d 681, 58 Cal. Rptr. 713 
tors, 270 Cal. App.2d 477. 75 Cal. Rptr. (1967). 
871 (1969); Millar v. James, 254 Cal. 13. Civ. Code § 1692. added by 
App.2d 530, 62 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967); Stats. 1961, Ch. 589, § 3. 
Topanga Corporation v. Gentile, 249 
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operative and appealed on the issue of pUllltlve damages, 
thus laying the foundation for an instruction on the matter at 
the retrial. 
The Supreme Court opinion by Justice Tobriner gives us 
a complete review of the tort of abuse of process. He reviews 
old basic cases14 and quotes Prosser on torts,16 concluding that 
there was ample evidence on which the jury could find that 
process was used for an improper purpose, in that defendant 
knew it was not entitled to possession of the turkeys, and that 
their seizure was made to coerce Templeton to discharge the 
debt of the Livingstons. The court further held that the 
refusal of the defendant to accept the judgment of the trial 
court in toto rendered the acceptance of the condition by plain-
tiff of no effect and, therefore reopened the question of puni-
tive damages. The Court further held that it was error for the 
trial court not to have instructed on the issue of punitive dam-
ages. Of course, punitive damages are allowed pursuant to 
Civil Code section 3294, which requires oppression, fraud, 
or malice; malice may be either express, or implied from the 
defendant's conduct. In other words, the requisite state of 
mind constituting malice may be shown or found objectively. IS 
The final disposition of this case following the decision 
of the Supreme Court is interesting. It was not retried: plain-
tiff's counsel advised the author that defendant agreed to a 
settlement of $120,000, which exceeds the full verdict of the 
jury in the first trial. The case certainly brings forth the re-
sponsibility of lawyers in evaluating the pros and cons of a 
factual situation, choosing the remedy which will be most 
productive for their client, and using discretion in rejecting 
the trial court's modification of the jury's verdict. 
14. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal.2d 15. Prosser, Law of Torts, 2d ed, p. 
210,317 P.2d 613 (1957); Kyne v. Eus- 667. 
tice, 215 Cal. App.2d 627, 30 Cal. Rptr. 16. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal.2d 
391 (1963); Tellefsen v. Key System 210, 230, 317 P.2d 613, 625 (1957). 
Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App.2d 611, 17 
Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961). 
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Defining conversion has been said to be difficult, if not im-
possible; Baron Bramwell said, "I am not very confident as to 
what is and what is not a conversion.,,17 More often, we are 
told what it is not, rather than what it is. For example, sev-
eral California cases indicate that "Neither good nor bad 
faith, neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge nor ig-
norance" are the gist of the cause of action.1s Nor is mistake 
about some phase of a factual situation of any significance.19 
On the affirmative side, we frequently find that it is a wilful 
interference with a chattel without legal justification, depriv-
ing one who is entitled to the chattel of the use and possession 
of it. 20 Also, it has been said that the wrongful exercise of 
dominion over another's personal property is the gist of con-
version.1 Yet it is clear that not every exercise of such do-
minion is sufficient, unless it is a substantial interference.2 
Section 222a of the Restatement of Torts, points out that an 
interference that will amount to a conversion is one that is 
so serious that the actor may justly be required to pay the 
other the full value of the chattel. The protected interest must 
be at least the right to possession and use of the chattel. In 
this respect the interest is the same as in a trespass action. 
In the recent case of llano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage,3 
Itano owned a boat which he kept in moorage at the defend-
ant's wharf. Itano was in arrears in his rental payments and 
considerable discussions went on between the parties. De-
fendant would have liked Itano to move his boat else-
where, and told him that unless he paid the past due rent the 
boat would be moved out of the regular slip to another spot 
17. National Merchants v. Lummey, 20. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App. 
44 L.T. 767, 1 Can. L. Rev. p. 145. 2d 783, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967). 
18. Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 139 1. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App. 
P. 815,51 L.R.A. N.S. 925 (1914); New- 2d 783,62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967). 
hart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App.2d 783, 62 2. Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal.2d 541, 
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967). 176 P.2d 1 (1946). 
19. Newhart v. Pierce, 254 Cal. App. 3. 267 Cal. App.2d 84, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 783, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1967); Baer 823 (1968). 
v. Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N.E. 328, 
54 A.L.R. 1328 (1927). 
CAL LAW 1970 345 
39
Moreau: Torts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Torts 
less desirable but which was locked. Defendant moved the 
boat and secured it by a lock and cable across the opening 
of the slip. Somehow the boat sank, due to a faulty engine 
hose that let water into the boat. Many items such as tools, 
kitchen utensils, food, and fishing gear were lost. Hano 
brought suit for damages resulting from the moving of the 
boat and its sinking. Plaintiff received verdict for $9,150.00, 
and defendant appealed from the denial of its motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The reviewing court 
reversed and directed the entry of judgment for defendant. 
The suit was for damages resulting from conversion or negli-
gence. No attempt was made to recover on the theory of evic-
tion, unlawful detainer, or forcible detainer. Moving the 
plaintiff's boat from one place to another did not interfere 
with plaintiff's use and possession of his boat. There was no 
claim that defendant intended to exercise ownership or made 
any use of the boat. The moving of the boat was not a 
conversion under Zaslow v. Kroenert4 nor under Jordan v. 
Talbot,5 since both cases require a substantial interference 
with plaintiff's possession. Moreover the plaintiff knew that 
the boat was likely to be moved, and also the approximate 
place to which it was to be moved. The court then examined 
the possibility of a cause of action for negligence, and found 
no basis for that recovery, even though the original assertion 
of a cause of action for negligence was abandoned prior to 
trial. As to trespass, there could be no recovery because 
there was no showing that the sinking of the boat was caused 
by the moving of the boat. 
Two cases purport to consider whether the tort of conver-
sion can be applied to mere ideas. Prosser suggests that there 
are no good reasons for not extending the tort to ideas,6 but 
under today's rules it is required that the ideas should inhere 
in some document. Milk, bakery, or newspaper routes are 
not subject to conversion.7 Several cases have involved 
the submission of ideas to movie companies for their use. In 
4. 29 Cal.2d 541, 176 P.2d 1 (1946). 6. Prosser, Law 0/ Torts. 3d ed .. p. 
5. 55 Ca1.2d 597. 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 82. 
361 P.2d 20, 6 A.LR.3d 161 (1961). 7. Supra, note 6. 
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California special provisions are made for the protection of 
the products of the mind.s Under Civil Code section 980, 
the author or proprietor of any composition in letters or 
art has an exclusive ownership " ... in the representation or 
expression thereof as against all persons except one who orig-
inally and independently creates the same or a similar composi-
tion." In Minniear v. Tors et al.,9 it was held such an author 
has protect able property. In the absence of such property, one 
who submits an idea to one who uses it is entitled to com-
pensation if the circumstances of the disclosure are such that 
an agreement to pay may fairly be implied. So a contract, 
express or implied, is necessary. And an inference of a prom-
ise to pay may result from conduct as well as words. But 
in the absence of a statutorily protectable property or a con-
tract, there can be no conversion of an idea. 
VIII. Fraud 
A. In General 
In California, statutes10 clearly set forth acts constituting 
fraud. Fraud may be (a) suggesting a false fact not believed 
to be true, (b) asserting a fact not warranted by information 
at hand though actually believing the same, (c) suppressing 
a true fact known or believed true or (d) promising to do 
something without the intention to perform. Inherent in 
these provisions is the state of mind necessary to constitute 
fraud. l1 The usual requirements are a representation, coupled 
with an intent that the representation be relied on by the per-
son entitled to rely and actual reliance. Damage must result 
from the reliance. 
The remedies for fraud are also detailed by statute.12 In 
general, the person relying is entitled only to his out-of-pocket 
8. Civ. Code §§ 980-985. 
9. 266 Cal. App.2d 495, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 287 (1968); see also Liability for 
the Use of Submitted Ideas, 13 Business 
Lawyer p. 90 (1957). 
10. See Civ. Code §§ 1572 and 1710. 
11. The intent to defraud need not 
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be specific and may be found, if neces-
sary, objectively. See Seeger v. Odell, 
18 Cal.2d 409, 115 P.2d 977, 136 
A.L.R. 1291 (1941). See also the later 
appeal, in the Seeger v. Odell case, 64 
Cal. App.2d 397, 148 P.2d 901 (1944). 
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damage.13 But fraud may be a basis for the recovery of 
punitive damages.14 Generally, negligence of the victim is no 
defense to actionable fraud. 15 
B. Opinions by Persons Holding Themselves Out as 
Qualified 
When is an alleged opinion a statement of fact and there-
fore an actionable fraud? In Harazim v. George Lynam,16 the 
plaintiffs claimed that defendants obtained money from them 
by representing that plaintiff's payments were for "interests 
in an enterprise established by defendants", when defendants 
knew such enterprise was a sham or merely a pretended busi-
ness. Plaintiffs actually received a fraudulent promissory 
note. Defendants referred to "memberships," "contributing 
associates," "pure trust indentures" or "certificates" as the 
consideration given. They claimed these were not misrepre-
sentations of fact, but were legal opinions made by laymen. 
They were merely making plaintiffs "contributing associates." 
The Court stated that "misrepresentations of law or legal 
opinions expressed by laymen are insufficient" to constitute 
fraud, as are opinions as to future profits to be realized.17 But 
the rule is otherwise where the declarant, as here, holds himself 
out to be specially qualified, that is, where he assumes to 
possess superior knowledge. IS 
13. Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 
2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948). 
14. Civ. Code § 3294. 
15. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. 26 
Cal.2d 412, 437, 159 P.2d 958, 972 
(1945); Seeger v. Odell, 18 Ca1.2d 409, 
115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291 (1941); 
Oakes v. McCarthy Co., 267 Cal. App. 
2d 231, 261, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127, 145 
(1968). 
16. 267 Cal. App.2d 127, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 670 (1968). 
17. 267 Cal. App.2d 127, 131, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 670, 672. 
18. Haserot v. Keller, 67 Cal. App. 
659, 228 P. 383 (1924). This holding is 
348 
supported by § 539 of the Restatement 
of Torts, which holds that an opinion is 
actionable if it is based on undisclosed 
facts as an implied statement that the 
maker knows of no facts incompatible 
with his opinion. Here defendants act-
ually knew the facts were incompatible 
with their stated opinions. 
Section 542 of the Restatement states 
that persons like these plaintiffs may 
rely on opinions of a party contracting 
them if he holds himself out as hav-
ing special knowledge of the matter 
which the recipients do not have or, 
knows that the recipients will rely on 
his opinion. 
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C. Holding a Principal for the Fraud of his Agent. 
What is necessary to bind a principal for the fraud of his 
agent on alleged ostensible authority? In Hartong v. Partake 
Inc./9 the Partake Company had area directors who had spe-
cific duties entitling them to hire assistants and to receive ad-
vertising materials for Partake. One such director, Werry, 
went beyond his authority by organizing businesses of his own 
along Partake lines, and telling his customers he was the west 
coast branch of Partake. In doing so, Werry associated him-
self with one Raub and introduced him to Mr. Melvin, Vice 
President of Partake. Werry and Raub, operating as their 
own "Western Way Company," made franchise contracts with 
plaintiffs, representing that they had the backing of the large 
and financially stable Partake. 
Plaintiffs lost considerable money when their franchises 
failed. They recovered judgments against Werry and Partake, 
which were affirmed on appeal. 
The Court laid down the following basic principles as a 
basis for holding a principal liable on the ostensible authority 
of his agent: 
1. The agency cannot be established by the representa-
tions or conduct of the purported agent alone. 
2. Liability is always based on an estoppel. 
3. There must be representations by the principal. 
4. These representations must lead to a reasonable belief 
of the party dealing with the agent that the agent 
has authority to represent the principal. 
5. The relying party must not be guilty of negligence. 
Here, the belief in the existence of the authority of the agent 
was based on the following facts and conduct by the defend-
ants: 
1. Werry's duty as area director included the creation of 
such new businesses as the Western Way Company. 
19. 266 Cal. App.2d 942, 72 Cal. 79 Cal. Rptr 816 (1969); modified in 
Rptr. 722 (1968); see also Meyer v. 275 A.C.A. 895. 
Ford Motor Co., 275 Cal. App.2d -, 
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2. Werry had authority to hire Raub, and Partake knew 
about Raub's being hired. 
3. Both Werry and Raub made extensive use of Partake's 
facilities. 
4. Partake knew of the use of Partake advertising, office, 
and program. 
5. Plaintiffs signed their contracts after Mr. Melvin of 
Partake had visited the office and was presumed to 
have seen what was going on. 
D. Duty to Speak Out as a Fiduciary 
When is there a duty to speak? In Black et al v. Shearson, 
Hammill and Co.,a° Dunbar was a partner in defendant's brok-
erage firm, and was also a director in a private corporation 
whose stock the brokerage firm was selling to its customers, 
including plaintiffs. A campaign was developed to finance the 
private corporation with "plans that represented the corpora-
tion in glowing terms." Plaintiffs paid $20,000 for $2000 
face value stock in the corporation-while the brokerage firm 
knew, through the knowledge of Dunbar, that the corporation 
was in serious financial straits. Of course, as a fiduciary, it 
was under an obligation to speak. 
Dunbar claimed, however, that as he was a fiduciary of the 
corporation, as a director, he could not divulge his information 
to the plaintiffs. The Court properly ruled against him and 
affirmed a verdict for $20,000 in compensatory damages and 
$5000 in punitive damages. The Court concluded that knowl-
edge of the falsity of the statements, or scienter, is an essential 
element of fraud, and that there was substantial evidence 
of the elements of fraud present,l In fact, the partners made 
the sales by explaining that Dunbar was an insider, and they 
were therefore in a position to know the facts, indicating 
that the element of malice was in evidence. 
The big fact here was the fiduciary relation. This relation-
ship imposed a duty to make full disclosure, and it was no 
20. 266 Cal. App.2d 362, 72 Cal. 1. Krause v. Apodaca, 186 Cal. App. 
Rptr. 157 (1968). 2d 413, 9 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1960). 
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excuse that Dunbar was under two inconsistent fiduciary rela-
tionships. No one can put himself in a position to serve two 
masters, and then use his dual position to the damage of one 
of his cestuis que trustent. 
E. Damages 
In Holder v. Home Savings and Loan Assn.,2 it is indicated 
that if a buyer of land is induced to purchase through the fraud 
of the vendor, and the vendee later defaults on his contract, 
such default alone will not defeat the claim of the vendee for 
damages occasioned by the fraud. This is true even after 
the vendor has foreclosed trust deeds following the purchaser's 
default. 3 We have noted that both compensatory and puni-
tive damages are available in fraud cases. 
In Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors of Santa Ana,4 the 
Court allowed both consequential and punitive damages in a 
rescission suit. For many years in fraud cases, damages were 
not allowed where the defrauded person sought rescission. 
The remedies were felt to be inconsistent. A suit for damages 
affirmed the contract, but a suit for rescission disaffirmed it. 
With the amendment of the rescission statute in 1961, this dis-
tinction was abandoned.6 In Horn, three types of recovery 
were allowed in the fraudulent sale of the Chevrolet car: res-
titutional payments of $842.72, disbursements of $500, and 
exemplary damages of $5000. This decision has eased the 
expansion of remedies and thereby removed many pitfalls 
for the practitioner. 
In Oakes v. McCarthy Co. et el,6 the Oakes were the pur-
chasers of a home in the Palos Verdes area of Los Angeles. 
The McCarthy Company had purchased the area, subdivided 
2. 267 Cal. App.2d 91, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
704 (1968). 
3. Garrett v. Perry, 53 Cal.2d 178, 
346 P.2d 758 (1959). This is an im-
portant case, as the cause of action for 
fraud survived the procedure of fore-
closure by the vendor. 
4. 270 Cal. App.2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
871 (1969). For further discussion of 
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this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this 
volume. 
5. Civ. Code § 1692, added Stats. 
1961, Ch. 589, § 3, p. 1734. The recov-
ery of punitive damages was fore-
shadowed in Millar v. James, 254 Cal. 
App.2d 530, 62 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967). 
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it, and constructed home sites and homes thereon. In the 
course of the development, other companies did work on the 
lots; the Thompson Corporation did the cutting, filling, and 
grading according to plans submitted by an engineering service 
company. This was to be done in the presence of an inspec-
tor supplied by the Warren Company. The Warren Company 
was to supervise the work done by Thompson. The inspector 
was discharged because he did not make the required compac-
tion tests. But Warren made the tests and issued its reports to 
McCarthy, the FHA, the County of Los Angeles and Mc-
Carthy's architect. 
September 7, 1956, the Oakes moved into their home. 
They were given a certificate guaranteeing workmanship and 
materials. It said the house was constructed under the Los 
Angeles Building Code, and that the county FHA inspectors 
had inspected the grounds and "these inspections are your 
assurance that this building has been properly constructed.m 
Plaintiff was never told his house was on fill and salesmen 
were told not to say anything about the fill unless specifically 
asked about it. By 1958, the house had moved with the down-
ward slide of the fill and the house was seriously damaged. 
The house would have to be removed and rebuilt. 
The jury returned verdicts against both the Warren Com-
pany and McCarthy for $14,825 as compensatory damages, 
and against McCarthy Company for $77,500 punitive dam-
ages. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that Warren owed 
a duty of care to plaintiffs although there was no privity 
between them.s When Warren undertook to supervise and 
inspect the cutting, filling, and grading, it assumed a duty 
toward plaintiffs to exercise due care. If it had given only 
7. 267 Cal. App.2d 231, 245, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 127, 135. 
8. The court relied upon Biakanja v. 
Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 65 
A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958). This case can 
well be compared to Connor v. Great 
Western Savings and Loan Assn., 69 
352 
Cal.2d 850, 23 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 
609 (1968), holding a lender of money 
for the financing of land development 
liable to a purchaser of a defective 
home on the land developed, even 
though there was no privity. 
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professional advice to McCarthy, then it would not be liable 
to plaintiffs. The jury evidently found that Warren was su-
pervising and inspecting, and therefore held it liable. 
The liability of McCarthy, on the other hand, was for fraud. 
There was no disclosure (a) that the house was on filled land 
or (b) the drainage was towards the rear without proper out-
lets. There were positive assertions that the premises were 
constructed (a) in good workmanlike manner and (b) in com-
pliance with FHA inspection regulations, such inspections be-
ing plaintiffs' assurance of proper grading. The intent to con-
ceal the fill could be inferred from the instructions to salesmen 
not to mention this fact unless asked about it. Even neg-
ligence on the plaintiffs' part would not have been a defense. 9 
Hence all the punitive damages of $77,500 were recover-
able from McCarthy, whose net worth was shown to be in 
excess of $2,000,000. Such net worth evidence is always pro-
bative evidence in the assessment of punitive damages. 
This case rounds out the protective duties owing to pur-
chasers of tract homes in projects where there is massive build-
ing: (a) institutions financing the project are liable to home-
owners who suffer losses from defective plans or construction, 
and there is a duty of ordinary care towards the then unknown 
owner; (b) there is a similar duty to exercise ordinary care on 
the part of those who supervise the cutting, filling, and grading 
of sites; (c) the promoters are held liable for misrepresenta-
tions as to the nature of the soundness of the site and the 
construction of the building itself, and this includes the fail-
ure to reveal latent conditions. Such suggestions, assertions, 
and suppressions constitute fraud under Civil Code sections 
1572 and 1710, and justify the recovery of punitive damages 
under Civil Code section 3294. These damages can be quite 
high if defendants happen to have substantial net worths. 
IX. Interference with Contractual Rights 
This tort, while relatively new, is important; it is related to 
other areas of the law such as labor, equity, and restitution, 
9. Seeger v. Odell, 18 Ca1.2d 409, 
115 P.2d 977,136 A.L.R. 1291 (1941). 
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as well as contract law. In fact, much labor law, before the 
advent of the federal acts relating thereto, was in the tort field. 
As a result of the federal acts, we now talk about "unfair labor 
practices" instead of tortious acts, but the subject is still im-
portant. Prosser devotes twenty-five pages of his text and 
some twenty pages of his casebook to it. Yet it is seldom 
covered in a course on torts. The material is at the end of the 
book, and we rarely get to it. Bar examinations usually avoid 
the subject. However, general principles of tort law are ap-
plicable. 
A tort involves an act or conduct by a person which dam-
ages a legally protected interest of another. The state of 
mind of the actor is often quite important. The tort of con-
tractual interference usually requires a bad state of mind. The 
conduct must be done knowingly or intentionally. If the con-
duct is carried out without knowledge of the existing contrac-
tual relationship, there is no actionable wrong. Yet the dam-
ages may be just as serious. 
Since Lumley v Gye/o it has been a tort for a person to 
knowingly induce a third person to breach a valid and existing 
contract. In such cases, the guilty party usually profits from 
the breach and his own wrongful conduct. The wronged per-
son may sue in tort for damages, in assumpsit or in quasi-
contract for the benefits realized. If no benefit is realized, the 
remedy is limited to the tort action. 
The case which prompts us to mention this tort is Friedman 
v. Jackson,ll which is particularly interesting since it involved 
a contract that was not enforceable; the contract was not in 
writing as required by the statute of frauds.12 Plaintiff was a 
real estate dealer or broker. Owners of real estate entered 
into an oral contract with plaintiff whereby plaintiff agreed to 
find a purchaser for the property, and it was agreed that a 
commission of 5 % of the purchase price would be paid to 
plaintiff for his services. Plaintiff showed the property to four-
teen prospective buyers, the defendant being one. Defend-
10. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). 12. Civ Code § 1624(5). 
11. 266 Cal. App.2d 517, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 129 (1968). 
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ant then informed plaintiff that the price was too high and that 
he was no longer interested. But defendant then told the 
owners that he had heard of their property being for sale from 
a friend, not from plaintiff, and proceeded to buy the property. 
The plaintiff sued defendant for the real estate commission 
on the basis of the wrongful interference with the unenforce-
able contract. Could defendant take advantage of this statute 
by stepping into the shoes of the seller, who would have had a 
good defense if he had refused to pay the commission? The 
trial court decided that the defense was available. The trial 
court presumably decided in defendant's favor in reliance on 
two cases that merely hold that a broker cannot recover his 
commission from a seller or owner who knowingly sells prop-
erty notwithstanding his contract with the broker. 
There is a strong policy behind the statute of frauds and, if 
the broker's contract is not in writing, he cannot recover either 
on the oral contract or in quasi-contract for the benefit con-
ferred. 13 He may conceivably recover on the basis of an 
estoppel, but such an estoppel is difficult to establish. 14 But a 
case against a third party wrongdoer, such as defendant, is an 
entirely different matter. There is no policy reason to pro-
tect him, he being an intentional wrongdoer acting with full 
knowledge of the interest of the broker. 
The important fact or question here is whether plaintiff 
broker has such an interest in an unenforceable contract that 
it is protected against invasions by third persons having knowl-
edge thereof. The Supreme Court of California, at a rather 
early date, spoke quite strongly about the valuable nature of 
the interests of parties to unenforceable contracts: 15 
Although the statute declares a parol contract for the 
sale of land void, it does not make it illegal. It is not 
a corrupt or wicked agreement; nor does it violate any 
principle of public policy. Parties are at liberty to act 
under such contracts if they think proper. Many such 
13. Colburn v. Sessin et aI., 94 Cal. 14. Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. 
App.2d 4, 209 P.2d 989 (1949); Sweeley App.2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954). 
v. Gordon, 47 Cal. App.2d 381, 118 P. 15. Hill v. Den, 121 Cal. 42, 53 P. 
2d 14 (1941). 642 (1898). 
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have been carried into complete effect by payment of the 
price and the conveyance of the land.16 
This favorable attitude is further evidenced by the fact that 
if a vendee makes a down payment on such an unenforceable 
contract, and then decides that he does not desire to go 
through with it, he cannot recover his down payment so long 
as the seller is willing to perform.17 So long as the seller does 
not repudiate, equity will not require restitution of the down 
payment. Moreover, it is hornbook law that a purchaser of 
real estate who has performed an oral contract in improving 
the property and making substantial payments is entitled to 
specific performance from the vendor. ls Even if the promise 
is to leave property by will to someone who is to render serv-
ices to a particular member of the family, the court will often 
compel the promisor, his representatives or other heirs, to 
convey the property to the promisee who has rendered long 
and faithful service in reliance on the oral promise. A new 
will cannot be written, but a constructive trust can be de-
c1ared.19 
Thus there is a real legal basis for finding that a person 
who has entered into an unenforceable contract has a valuable 
right that must be respected and protected against intentional 
and unprivileged interferences. The court in Friedman quotes 
from the 1963 New Jersey case of Harris v. Perea 
One who unjustifiably interferes with the contract of 
another is guilty of a wrong. And since men usually 
16. 121 Cal. 42, 45, 53 P. 642, 643. 
17. Noel v. Dumont Builders, Inc., 
178 Cal. App.2d 691, 3 Cal. Rptr. 220 
(1960); Maddox v. Rainoldi, 163 Cal. 
App.2d 384, 329 P.2d 599 (1958); Laf-
fey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 P. 
471, 86 A.S. 283 (1901). 
18. Engasser v. Jones, 88 Cal. App. 
2d 171, 198 P.2d 546 (1948). 
19. Justice Traynor explained why 
this is done in Monarco v. Lo Greco, 
35 Cal.2d 621, 626, 220 P.2d 737, 741 
(1950): 
"In reality it is not the representa-
356 
tion that the contract will be put in 
writing or that the statute will not be 
invoked, but the promise that the con-
tract will be performed that a party re-
lies upon when he changes his position 
because of it. Moreover, a party who 
has accepted the benefits of an oral 
contract will be unjustly enriched if 
the contract is not enforced whether his 
representations related to the require-
ments of the statute or were limited to 
affirmations that the contract would be 
performed." 
20. 41 N.J. 455,197 A.2d 359 (1964). 
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honor their promises no matter what flaws a lawyer can 
find, the offender should not be heard to say the con-
tract he meddled with could not have been enforced. l 
And as stated in Zimmerman v. Bank of America:2 
The nature of the tort does not vary with the legal 
strength, or enforceability, of the relation disrupted. The 
actionable wrong lies in the inducement to break the 
contract or to sever the relationship, not in the kind of 
contract or relationship so disrupted, whether it is writ-
ten or oral, enforceable or not enforceable.3 
Justice Herndon goes on to state: ". . . a purchaser may 
not by fraudulent means, cause a seller unwittingly to so 
change his position that thereafter he cannot reasonably be 
required to fulfill his commitment to his agent."4 
The Court then pointed out that the California decisions 
referred to are in accord with the provisions of the Restate-
ment of Torts on the matter. An analysis of section 766 of 
the Restatement is effectively done. Section 7 66 provides: 
One who, without a privilege to do so, induces or other-
wise purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform 
a contract with another or (b) enter into or continue a 
business relation with another is liable to the other for 
the harm caused thereby. 
The greater definiteness of the right under clause (a) than the 
right under clause (b) indicates that there would be a greater 
privilege to induce a party not to enter into the relationship 
than to induce a breach of a definite contractual relationship, 
as was the situation in Friedman. 
X. Governmental Accountability 
Accountability, of course, is the opposite of immunity. 
Immunity gives one a valuable position; it is one of the four 
1. 41 N.J. 455, 197 A.2d 359, 363. 3. 191 Cal. App.2d 55, 57, 12 Cal. 
2. 191 Cal. App.2d 55, 12 Cal. Rptr. Rptr. 319, 320. 
319 (1961). 4. 266 Cal. App.2d 517,520,72 Cal. 
Rptr. 129, 131 (1968). 
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fundamental legal relationships.5 It is a comforting position 
to be in, knowing that no one has the power or right to bring 
a suit for damages against the immune person. Very often, 
persons who have caused someone damage watch the passing 
of the statute of limitations with a feeling of great relief; such 
a person has suddenly become immune. Fortunately, injured 
persons can feel a sense of relief from the fact that immunities 
are on the way out. Charitable institutions, formerly immune 
from liability, are now losing this desired and valued status.6 
Likewise, interspousal immunity is on the way out; in Califor-
nia it is gone both in intentional' and negligent wrongdoingS 
by one spouse against the other. Where children are involved, 
that too is being changed, especially where the parent is in-
sured.9 
Immunity of governments has been the rule dating back to 
kingship days when people were "subjects" of kings. The 
word "subject" in this sense is foreign to our understanding. 
And this is probably why Chief Justice Traynor said in Mus-
kopf v. Corning Hospital District:1o 
How [this rule of sovereign immunity] became in the 
United States the basis for a rule that the federal and state 
governments did not have to answer for their torts has 
been called 'one of the mysteries of legal evolution.'ll 
5. Professor Hohfeld of Yale named 
these four as right. privilege, power, and 
immunity. Hohfeld, Some Fundamen-
tal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 Yale Law Journal pp. 
16-59 (1913-14). 
6. Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen 
27 Cal.2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946); 
Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Salvation 
Army, 83 Cal. App. 455, 256 P. 1106 
(1927). 
7. Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d 683, 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962). 
8. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 
Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962). 
9. See 19 Hastings L.J. 201 (1967-
68); see also 1963 A.S. 376. 
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10. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 
359 P.2d 457 (1961) modified in 57 Cal. 
2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 
325. 
11. 55 Cal.2d 211, 214, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
89, 90, 359 P.2d 457, 459; modified in 
57 Cal.2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 
P.2d 325. For an historical perspec-
tive, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 
419, 1 L. Ed. 440, 2 S.Ot. 419 (1792). 
It was decided that a citizen could sue a 
state in the federal courts. Only Justice 
Iredell dissented, arguing that the prin-
ciple of immunity is fundamental. Sig-
nificantly, the Court was' immediately 
overruled by the first "post adoption 
of the Constitution" amendment, the 
eleventh. It provided that the judicial 
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Immunity being the rule and liability the exception, citizens 
injured by the tortious conduct of governmental employees act-
ing in the course and scope of their employment were left to 
seek their redress in the mercy of the legislature by submission 
of a private bill for compensation. Legislative and judicial 
exceptions to this cumbersome and uncertain remedy became 
more numerous, as legislatures found that the growth of gov-
ernmental activity was occasioning a proportionate increase 
in the volume of private bills seeking compensation for govern-
mental wrongs. Early judicial exceptions predicated liability 
on an often tenuous and illusory distinction in the nature of the 
activity, liability being imposed when the sovereign acted in a 
proprietary capacity and denied when functioning in a gov-
ernmental activity. Legislative modifications to the doctrine 
were often narrow and limited in the kinds of public entities 
within the statutory purview, resulting in illogical and serious 
inequalities; recovery often depended upon which particular 
governmental agency committed the wrong.12 
The adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act13 in 1946, 
creating tort liability of the federal government for losses and 
injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of its em-
ployees while acting within the scope of their employment, was 
a great step forward, setting the direction for other jurisdic-
tions to follow. Immunity was retained for official acts in-
volving discretion (acts involving the exercise of jUdgment) 
and also for torts involving a specific intent or high degree 
of CUlpability. Much of the litigation under the Act concerned 
the meaning of the "discretion" conduct clause. Dalehite v. 
power of the United States should not 
be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by one 
of the citizens of another state or by 
citizens or subjects of a foreign state. 
Thus, it became federal policy that an 
individual cannot sue a state without 
its consent, either in its own or in fed-
eral courts. See Borchard, Government 
Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. p. 6. 
12. For extensive historical back-
CAL LAW 1970 
ground of both national and state immu-
nity see: Jaffe, Suits Against Govern-
ments and Officers, 77 Harv. L. Rev., p. 
1 (1963-64); Borchard, Government 
Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J., p. 1; 
VanAlstyne, Governmental Tort Liabil-
ity: Judicial Law Making in a Statu-
tory Milieu, 15 Stan. L. Rev., p. 163 
(1962-63); Muskopf v. Corning Hospi-
tal District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
89, 359 P.2d 457. 
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United StatesI4 set the pattern. Where there is room for policy 
judgment and decision, there is discretion. So acts of subordi-
nates carrying out such policies according to plan are not ac-
tionable. 
Early cases in California followed the rule of immunity, bas-
ing the immunity on a lack of consent to be sued.15 A statute 
enacted in 1893, providing that those having claims for neg-
ligence against the state were authorized". . . to bring suit 
thereon . . ." was subsequently held not to be a waiver of 
sovereign immunity but a mere grant of a procedural right.16 
Other bases for preserving immunity and rejecting liability 
were: lack of consent to substantive liability,I7 lack of power 
to respond in damages/8 and inapplicability of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to municipal officers charged with a duty 
prescribed and limited by law.19 Early exceptions to the rule 
of sovereign immunity were found in the constitutional re-
quirement to pay just compensation for private property taken 
for public use,20 liability for obligations assumed under a con-
tract,1 and what became known as the "nuisance exception."2 
Muskopf3 and Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District4 
discarded the rule and pressured the adoption of the state Tort 
Claims Act in 1963. 
With enactment of the California Tort Claims Act, ". 
all common law or judicially declared forms of liability, except 
for such liability as may be required by state or federal con-
stitution . . ."5 were abolished. Government Code section 
14. 346 U.S. 15, 97 L.Ed. 1427, 73 
S.Ct. 956 (1953). 
15. Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 P. 
951, 27 AS. 203, 15 L.R.A 431 (1892). 
16. Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 
55 P. 1000 (1899). 
17. Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 53 
P. 416 (1898). 
18. Hensley v. Reclamation Dist. No. 
556, 121 Cal. 96, 53 P. 401 (1898). 
19. Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 
127 P. 50 (1912). 
20. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. City of 
360 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L.Ed. 979, 
17 S.Ct. 581 (1897). 
1. Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 
38 P. 457, 43 AS. 158 (1894). 
2. Conniff v. City and County of 
San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 7 P. 41 
(1885). 
3. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 
359 P.2d 457 (1961) modified in 57 Cal. 
2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 
325. 
4. 55 Cal.2d 224, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
359 P.2d 465 (1961). 
5. Gov. Code, § 815. See Legisla-
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815 limits liability to the extent provided by statute. Section 
815 (b) provides that the only immunities are those provided 
by statute. Under the same section, the liability of a public 
entity is subject to any defenses that would be available if it 
were a private person. Section 815.2 ( a) makes the state 
agency liable for injuries caused by an employee in the course 
of his employment if the employee is liable apart from this sec-
tion, while part (b) of the same section provides that the 
agency is not liable if the employee or official is immune. 
Thus the immunity of the state agency and the official are co-
extensive. The general rule is that liability exists, while im-
munity rests on exceptions. This reverses the old attitude 
toward governmental accountability. 
Thus to get immunity we must look to the statutory excep-
tions. To begin with, we find that a state agency cannot be lia-
ble for punitive damages awarded under section 3294 of the 
Civil Code.6 Government Code sections 818.2, 818.6, and 
818.8, are specific exceptions to liability for acts such as those 
that indicate a high degree of culpability or intentional wrong-
doing. Government Code section 820.2 sets forth the excep-
tion for acts involving discretion, much as set forth in the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, and the exception covers such acts 
whether or not the discretion is abused. How are discretion-
ary acts to be separated from so-called ministerial ones? 
In Johnson v. State,7 William Bear, as placement officer of 
the State Youth Authority, had a young parolee, sixteen years 
of age, whom he wished to place in a foster home. The J ohn-
sons had expressed a desire to give a poor boy a home and 
Bear arranged to place young Chemlouski with them. He 
had homicidal tendencies and had a background of violence 
and cruelty towards animals and humans. 
A few days after he arrived in the Johnson home, he as-
saulted Mrs. Johnson with a butcher knife. Bear never 
warned the Johnsons about the known tendencies of the youth. 
tive Committee Comment-Senate, p. 7. 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 
119. 447 P.2d 352 (1968). 
6. Gov. Code § 818. 
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Suit was brought against the state; the state filed a motion for 
summary judgment and it was granted, on the state's argument 
that the parole officer was immune while exercising discretion 
and so the state was immune. The state, trying to bring itself 
within the misrepresentation exception, also argued that Bear 
had told the Johnsons that there was nothing in Chemlouski's 
background indicative of violent or criminal tendencies, and 
as such he had misrepresented the facts to them. Government 
Code section 818.8, grants immunity to the public entity where 
injury is caused by a misrepresentation by an employee wheth-
er or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional. 
This is one of the few exceptions to the general principle of 
respondeat superior, which prevails throughout the act. A 
question of immunity is also raised by section 845.8, which 
precludes liability from attaching to either the public entity 
or the employee in determining whether to parole or release a 
prisoner. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment. 
Justice Tobriner, speaking for the Supreme Court regretted to 
some extent that the act makes the immunity of the agency 
coextensive with that of the employee, for that compels the 
Court to proceed with a determination, or an interpretation 
of the statutory language. He indicated that the problem 
would have been simpler if it were recognized that there may 
be different reasons for granting immunity to the agency than 
for doing so for the employee. In dealing with the grant of 
immunity under section 845.8, Justice Tobriner viewed this 
immunity as terminating with the decision to parole or re-
lease. Negligence occurring after the decision to parole is 
subject to redress unless there is immunity under some other 
section. He also refused to consider granting immunity on the 
basis that a misrepresentation was made pursuant to section 
818.8. The same word appears in the federal Act, and in 
United States v. Neustadt,S misrepresentation was limited to 
its general meaning in the law of deceit, which refers to finan-
8. 366 u.s. 696, 6 L.Ed.2d 614, 81 stadt, a purchaser, relied. ReId, the 
S.Ct. 1294 (1961); F.R.A. misrepresent- government not liable. 
ed the property value on which Neu-
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cial losses rather than personal injuries. The failure to give 
warning to the J ohnsons cannot be referred to as a misrepre-
sentation. The Court stated that there was a duty to reveal the 
fact of the boy's criminal record, if known. So the question 
narrowed itself to whether the revealing of facts, if known, is 
a matter of discretion. If it is a matter of discretion, the im-
munity is given whether or not discretion was abused.9 
The choice was whether to use dictionary definitions of the 
word "discretionary" or to consider policy considerations. 
When should there be a blanket rule not to entertain a tort ac-
tion alleging that careless conduct contributed to the govern-
mental decision? The Court recognized that line-drawing dif-
ficulties would arise constantly, but decided that there is no 
plausible reason for allowing immunity here. In thinking 
about statutory interpretation, this writer likes to return to the 
language of Judge Learned Hand: 
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their 
literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most 
reliable source of interpreting the meaning of any writ-
ing: be it statute, a contract, or anything else. But it 
is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of a dictionary; 
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose 
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imagina-
tive discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 10 
The Court here reviewed the dictionary approach and then re-
fused to enmesh itself in such a semantic thicket, and instead 
pursued the quest for the legislative intent and purpose. It 
had its own decision in Ham v. County of Los Angeles,ll point-
ing to the impossibility of doing anything without some discre-
tion being involved, ". . . even if it is only the driving of a 
nail." Nearly everything involves ministerial as well as discre-
tionary elements. A line must be drawn somewhere. Cer-
tainly the case stands for a separation between making a deci-
9. Gov. Code § 820.2. 326 U.S. 404, 90 L.Ed. 165, 66 S.Ct. 
10. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 193. 
737, 739 (1945) cert. granted 325 U.S. 11. 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 
847, 89 L.Ed. 1969, 65 S.Ct. 1409 affd. 462, 468 (1920). 
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sion and carrying it out. The exception for immunity termi-
nates when the decision is made, and the liability in tort takes 
over in the performance of the task. 
The thinking in the case of Johnson v. State/2 is affirmed 
in the case of McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles.13 Here a 
police officer answered a call about a collision at an intersec-
tion within the city limits. While investigating the accident, 
he carelessly directed the plaintiff, who had been slightly in-
jured in the collision, to go into the traffic and show him just 
where the impact had taken place. No flares were set out, as 
generally required in such situations at night. Another driver 
did not see the officer and plantiff standing together and struck 
plaintiff, causing him serious injury. The Supreme Court 
by Justice Tobriner, again, held for the plaintiff, affirming the 
decision of the lower court. The city relied on section 820.2 
of the Government Code, and as in Johnson claimed that what 
the officer did involved discretionary elements. The Court 
reviewed the dictionary semantic approach and then concluded 
that classifying the act of a public employee as discretionary 
will not produce immunity under section 820.2, if the injury 
to another results, not from the discretion in undertaking the 
act, but from the employee's negligence in performing it, citing 
Johnson v. State14 and Sava v. Fuller. 15 The Court added fur-
ther that in this instance discretion was not causal; it was neg-
ligence in carrying out the assignment that was causal. Thus, 
the separation of negligence in performance from the discre-
tionary assignment is now firmly rooted in our jurisprudence. 
These cases show the trend; immunity is limited by statutory 
interpretation. 
The riots in the Watts area of Los Angeles in 1965, caused 
severe losses to many property owners in the area. Assembled 
crowds destroyed valuable properties and businesses. Police 
and governmental agencies did nothing to prevent the destruc-
tions and losses. A number of those sustaining losses claimed 
12. 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 14. 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 
447 P.2d 352 (1968). 447 P.2d 352 (1968). 
13. 70 Cal.2d 252, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389, 15. 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 57 Cal. 
449 P.2d 453 (1969). Rptr. 312 (1967). 
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damages from city authorities and officers who had failed 
to take any steps to stop the riots. In Susman v. City of Los 
Angeles/6 eleven causes of action were stated against the city. 
The action sought to charge the City of Los Angeles and the 
State of California, by and through their employees, with neg-
ligently and carelessly causing and aggravating the rioting, 
thereby causing the losses. All the causes were stated in simi-
lar language. The trial court sustained demurrers to all these 
causes; plaintiffs appealed therefrom. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decisions. These claims 
were based entirely on the alleged inaction of the city's officers. 
The Court pointed out that the liability of governmental agen-
cies is now governed by the State Tort Liability Act. 17 Section 
818.2 of the Government Code provides that: "A public entity 
is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing to 
adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law." Like-
wise, section 845, provides that: "Neither a public entity nor 
a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police de-
partment or otherwise provide police protection service or, if 
police protection service is provided, for failure to provide suf-
ficient police protection service." The Law Revision Commis-
sion has stated that: "Whether such police protection should 
be provided at all, and the extent to which it should be 
provided, are political decisions which are committed to 
policy-making officials of government."lS Courts cannot as-
sume the making of such decisions. Certainly those decisions 
involve the exercise of discretion, which is definitely within the 
range of immunity under section 820.2. 
This decision is certainly to be contrasted with the Johnson 
case. Perhaps if police officers had attempted to act after a 
decision to act had been made, their methods of carrying out 
the policy decided on might have been said to be ministerial 
and have required them to be performed with due care. It 
seems pertinent to inquire whether governmental agents can 
16. 269 Cal. App.2d 803, 75 CaL 18. Gov. Code § 845. See Law Re-
Rptr. 240 (1969). vision Commission Comment, p. 270. 
17. Gov. Code §§ 810 et seq 
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always protect themselves by remaining inactive and doing 
nothing. 
In Flournoy v. State of California,19 the state was charged 
with maintaining a long bridge in a negligent and dangerous 
condition, in that it became covered with ice and no warning 
notice was posted. This bridge, 565 feet long, is on highway 
89 in Shasta County. The southbound approach, on which 
decedent was traveling, is three miles long, level, and well 
paved. There was ice only on the bridge, formed by mist from 
the flowing stream. Decedent was followed by a truck. De-
cedent's car slid out of control on the ice; the truck did like-
wise and crashed into decedent's car. As indicated above, 
the Government Code now sets the guidelines for the govern-
ment's liabilities and immunities. Section 835 makes the 
state liable for a dangerous condition of public property. 
Liability may attach where the government created the 
dangerous condition, or where it had notice of the condition 
and failed to take protective measures to warn travelers. 
There are again statutory exceptions. There is immunity 
where (a) there is a failure to put up traffic signals prescribed 
by the Vehicle Code,20 (b) for injuries caused by the approved 
plans or designs of public works,l (c) for accidents caused by 
reasonably apparent weather conditions2 and (d) for accidents 
due to reasonable government acts.3 
Basic here is whether the formation of ice on the bridge was 
part of its design; was this an ice-prone bridge for which the 
state would be liable? Also, there could be liability because 
of the state's knowledge of the condition, which a reasonably 
careful driver would not recognize and of which the state 
failed to warn. The first theory involves the creation of a 
dangerous condition, and the second passive negligence in 
failing to warn. The state, of course, set up all arguments 
pointing to immunity. The trial court entered summary judg-
ment for defendant, which the Court of Appeal reversed on 
19. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
485 (1969). 
20. Gov. Code § 830.4. 
366 
1. Gov. Code § 830.6. 
2. Gov. Code § 831. 
3. Gov. Code § 835.4. 
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the theories indicated. The trial and future appeals may make 
more clear the principles determining the liability and im-
munity of the state for dangerous conditions of public prop-
erty. 
• 
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